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“A business that makes nothing but money is a poor business.”  
-Henry Ford.1 
 
“‘[P]rofit goes with liability,’ meaning that only a person willing to bear a 
risk of loss is entitled to claim a profit.”2 
 
Many free-market capitalists believe in the syllogism that if a free market 
results in progress, and if progress is good, then by definition a free market 
                                                            
 +  Associate Professor of Law; John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois.  He received his 
Juris Doctor, Master of Science in Taxation, and Baccalaureate Science in Commerce degrees 
from DePaul University.  He also received his certificate as a Certified Public Accountant 
(Illinois). The author wishes to thank his research assistants Ashley (Younjoo) Ahn, Huiting He, 
and Kimberly Regan.  The author is eternally grateful to Patricia Mendoza for her comments, 
insights, and tireless support.  This Article is dedicated to my friend and mentor, Professor James 
Colliton (1944–2009) of DePaul University.  Your friendship is missed. 
 1. Message From Ford Motor Company Fund and Community Services President Jim 
Vella, FORD MOTOR COMPANY FUND & COMMUNITY SERVICES, http://corporate.ford.com/our-
company/community/ford-fund/presidents-message-401p?releaseId=1244754314736 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2012). 
 2. Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 615, 620 (1997). 
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must be good.3  Two hundred years of economic development support this 
proposition.4  The capitalist model, which is premised on free-market 
ideology,5 is credited with producing many of the riches enjoyed by society as 
a whole.6  Indeed, the pursuit of economic freedom ranks among the primary 
motivations for the founding of the United States.7  The corporation has 
enabled that pursuit and can be credited with greatly contributing to the 
advancement of free-market capitalism.8  
Proponents of the corporate enterprise argue that corporations have 
benefitted the American economy and, by extension, American society.9  
Undoubtedly, the corporation has created economic opportunity for 
shareholders,10 and it is undeniable that “America owes much of its early 
development to these business enterprises.”11  
However, the use of the corporate device has exacted a heavy price on 
society, and observers have called its social utility into question.12  Concerns 
about abusive practices have resulted in calls for additional regulation of 
                                                            
 3. See, e.g., 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 2096.30 (2011) [hereinafter FLETCHER] (sharing the view that by striving to 
maximize profits, corporations are acting to benefit society). 
 4. See, e.g., Robert Hessen, Capitalism, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 
57, 57 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008) (tracing the history of capitalism). 
 5. Free-market ideology proposes that prices will adjust according to supply and demand, 
and that societal welfare will be maximized at the point where supply equals demand.  ANDREW 
GILLESPIE, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS 86 (2007).  Therefore, governmental intervention is 
not advantageous.  Id. at 85–86. 
 6. Hessen, supra note 4, at 59 (noting the proliferation of luxury items as a result of 
capitalism). 
 7. See 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492–1900), at 29 (2002) (“[C]olonists 
were enticed to an America that was almost entirely owned and operated as a business.”). 
 8. Hessen, supra note 4, at 57–61 (noting the parallel rise in capitalism and the growth of 
industry and the corporation). 
 9. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM: THE PUBLIC PHASES OF 
CORPORATIONS, THEIR USES, ABUSES, BENEFITS, DANGERS, WEALTH, AND POWER, WITH A 
DISCUSSION OF THE SOCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS TO WHICH 
THEY HAVE GIVEN RISE 4–5 (1891) (observing that corporations “have cheapened the 
necessaries of life, given quick and easy connection between distant points, developed 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and commerce; created employment for labor, marketed the 
products which before were not worth the cost of transportation, lowered the cost of living in 
Europe and America, transformed the uninhabited wildernesses into rich farms, towns, cities, and 
States; found land worth nothing and made it worth millions, and caused an interchange of the 
manufactures, luxuries, literature, arts, sciences, and ideas of the world”). 
 10. Hessen, supra note 4, at 58. 
 11. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES, CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d ed. 2009). 
 12. COOK, supra note 9, at 78 (calling the corporation “as perfect and heartless a  
money-making machine as the wit of man has ever devised”). 
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corporations and increased corporate social responsibility (CSR).13  Although 
corporations have yielded many great benefits to society, they also have 
imposed many substantial burdens.14   
This Article contends that traditional legal theories have not adequately 
discouraged corporations from making socially undesirable choices and have 
not encouraged corporations to take socially responsible action.  In response to 
the inadequacies of prior law, the CSR movement surfaced as an alternative 
and has become an important voice in the effort to call attention to 
corporations’ irresponsible and unfettered actions.15  The CSR movement has 
contributed to gains in labor,16 environmental,17 and safety policies.18  
However, the CSR voice lacks the power of legislation, and without 
legislation, its voice lacks legal authority. 
Without legislation mandating responsible corporate behavior, corporations 
will continue to engage in behavior that is socially undesirable, albeit 
profitable, for its shareholders.19  With the benefit of enabling legislation, the 
corporate entity can be both a profit-making device for its shareholders and a 
                                                            
 13. See, e.g., Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Institutions: 
Beyond Dodd-Frank, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 13, 16 (2012) (arguing for 
mandatory corporate-responsibility requirements); see also GRANT THORNTON, CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A NECESSITY NOT A CHOICE 2 (2008) (advocating the implementation 
of CSR). 
 14. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(describing the Bhopal India leak as “the most devastating industrial disaster in history [that 
resulted in] the deaths of over 2,000 persons and injuries of over 200,000 caused by lethal gas 
known as methyl isocyanate which was released from a chemical plant operated by Union 
Carbide India Limited”). 
 15. See Press Release, CSRWire, 2009 CSR Year in Review: Corporate  
Social Responsibility Solidifies into a Movement (Jan. 20, 2010), available  
at http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/28632-2009-CSR-Year-in-Review-Corporate-Social-
Responsibility-Solidifies-Into-a-Movement-. 
 16. See Corporate Social Responsibility & Labor, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org 
/99RH4AT0K0 (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
 17. See World’s Largest Firms “Acting on Climate Change”’ Analysis Shows, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 14, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/sep/14/ 
worlds-largest-firms-climate-change (describing the increasing number of large businesses that 
are taking steps to reduce emissions affecting climate change); see also Products and the 
Environment, HASBRO, http://csr.hasbro.com/sus07-products-and-the-environment.php# 
video-1 (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) (highlighting Hasbro’s commitment to using environmentally 
sustainable products, materials, and packaging). 
 18. See Basic Approach to Safety, MAZDA, http://www.mazda.com/csr/safety/basic 
_position/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (outlining Mazda’s various safety initiatives in the context of 
vehicles, people, roads, and infrastructure). 
 19. See Barclift, supra note 13, at 43. 
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responsible corporate citizen.20  This dual function may translate into customer 
loyalty, consumer preference, and ultimately corporate profits.21   
Part I discusses the corporation’s early role and the debate concerning its 
purpose.  Part II explores the legal justifications for the pursuit of profit and 
discusses how modern financial theory contributed to profit-maximization 
efforts.  Part III then discusses the failure of traditional legal theories to 
provide either adequate public protections or corporate incentives for 
responsible action.  Finally, Part IV proposes encouraging responsible 
corporate action through the use of accounting rules and tax law.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
The idea of CSR as an institutional mechanism to protect societal interests 
has been a topic of continuing debate in American legal jurisprudence for 
nearly a century.22  In 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, the Harvard 
Law Review presented a historic academic debate between Professor E. 
Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law School and Professor Adolf A. Berle of 
Columbia Law School regarding corporations’ role in society.23  During this 
time period, the American economy roiled in despair as stock values crashed 
and unemployment ranks swelled,24 and misery became an uninvited guest in 
many homes throughout the country.  In response, many blamed corporations 
for contributing to the financial uncertainty.25   
In their debate, Professors Dodd and Berle diverged on the societal purpose 
of corporations.  Professor Dodd claimed that the public saw the corporation as 
an “economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making 
                                                            
 20. See THORNTON, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that responsible corporate action benefits 
businesses by improving their reputation while also enhancing ethical business practices). 
 21. Jackie Luan & Kusum L. Ailawadi, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Build 
Customer Loyalty?, ADAGE (May 24, 2011), http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/corporate-
social-responsibility-build-customer-loyalty/227729/. 
 22. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Corporate Law, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for 
Confusion, 45 BUS. L. 2253, 2254 (1990) (noting that the debate about corporate accountability 
commenced in the early 1930s). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Gene Smiley, Great Depression, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 
supra note 4, at 320, 320 (“[I]n 1933, 25 percent of all workers and 37 percent of all nonfarm 
workers were completely out of work.”); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve, 
Remarks at the H. Parker Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, Washington and Lee  
University: Money, Gold, and the Great Depression (Mar. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200403022/default.htm (“During the 
major contraction phase of the Depression, between 1929 and 1933, real output in the United 
States fell nearly 30 percent. . . . [T]he unemployment rate rose from about 3 percent to nearly 25 
percent . . . .”). 
 25. See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder Shareholder Theory of Corporate 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 317 (2011) (stating that the 
New Deal policies enacted in the wake of the Great Depression were aimed at “temper[ing] 
corporations’ influence in society”). 
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function.”26  In contrast, Professor Berle maintained that “a social-economic 
absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe; 
and in any case it hardly affords the soundest base on which to construct the 
economic commonwealth which industrialism seems to require.”27  Professor 
Berle’s position eventually triumphed as the prevailing model in American 
corporate jurisprudence.28  Today, however, the question of the corporation’s 
role still lingers.29  
Throughout the twentieth century, corporations’ management teams 
embraced the principle of maximizing shareholder profitability as the 
justification for their choices and decisions.30  Although this approach may be 
economically beneficial and favorable in some respects, it also has led to 
undesirable results, including personal injury, death, and other socially 
destructive consequences.31  In fact, corporations have been charged with and 
found guilty of criminal conduct,32 polluting the environment,33 and deceiving 
consumers.34  As a result, society has had to absorb both the financial and the 
nonfinancial costs of corporate decisions.35  
                                                            
 26. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1148 (1932). 
 27. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365, 1372 (1932). 
 28. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Corporate Law, supra note 22, at 2255. 
 29. See, e.g., C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An 
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 77–79 (2002) 
(noting that discussions as to corporations’ societal role have persisted into the twenty-first 
century). 
 30. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
163, 164 (2008) (attributing the widely held tenet that the purpose of corporations is profit 
maximization to the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)). 
 31. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(noting that Playtex marketed high-absorbency tampons to increase profits despite its awareness 
that such products caused toxic shock syndrome, which led to the plaintiff’s death); Gillham v. 
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 105–07 (6th Cir. 1975) (indicating that a corporation continued to 
market and sell color televisions despite notice that its product posed a major fire hazard). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 232, 239 (10th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Griffin, 401 F. 
Supp. 1222, 1224–25 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Metro Mgmt. Corp., 541 
F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 33. See Sandy Smith, Tyson Foods Pleads Guilty to 20 Felonies, Agrees to $7.5 Million 
Fine, EHS TODAY (June 27, 2003), http://ehstoday.com/news/ehs_imp_36455/. 
 34. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 35. See Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. 
& COM. 1, 51–52 (2004) (contending that corporations that engage in undesirable behavior, such 
as “destroying the environment, poisoning employees, and undermining societies,” in an effort to 
maximize their wealth lack incentives to internalize costs and are able to successfully pass on any 
costs to society). 
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The growth of corporate enterprise coincided with the Industrial Revolution, 
as the banking, oil, railroad, and steel industries grew.36  Investors embraced 
the corporate form during the industrial era because it was an efficient way to 
accumulate capital while limiting personal liability.37  However, this period 
also witnessed American corporations racing to the bottom of regulatory 
environments, meaning that entities sought to incorporate in business-friendly 
environments free from regulatory intrusion into internal corporate affairs.38  A 
new race, on a global scale, developed during the late twentieth century as 
corporations fought to establish their economic presence in the world 
marketplace and began to seek out markets in which a lack of regualtions 
would allow the exploitation of labor and resources.39  
Some criticize corporations for conduct that results in socially unacceptable 
consequences.  For example, detractors point to corporations’ fight against 
food-labeling requirements,40 seat-belt requirements,41 and warning labels.42  
CSR proponents argue that corporations must behave responsibly when 
choosing among various business alternatives.43  They frequently cite the 
transference of costs by corporations onto unwilling participants when a 
corporation fails to act responsibly.44  They also maintain that the corporate 
enterprise has a broader responsibility extending beyond the limited duty it 
                                                            
 36. David Ronnegard, The Legal Ontology of the Corporation as a Description of Its Goal, 
and Its Role in Society 10 (INSEAD, Faculty & Research Working Paper 2011/16/ISIC, 2011), 
available at http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=47140. 
 37. Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing 
in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1280 (2004). 
 38. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 41–42 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., John C. Knapp, Note, The Boundaries of the ILO: A Labor Rights Argument 
for Institutional Cooperation, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 369, 384 (2003) (discussing the new race to 
the bottom in the context of regulating the global labor market). 
 40. See, e.g., Jeffery Young, Movie Theaters Fight to Keep Popcorn from Food-Labeling 
Rule, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com 
/html/movies/2014505511_popcorn16.html (detailing the opposition of movie-theater chains to a 
regulation that would require theaters to list the calorie content of popcorn). 
 41. See, e.g., Lindsey Ellerson, To Buckle or Not to Buckle: Debate over Seat Belts on 
Buses Heats Up, ABC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/seatbelt-debate-
states-mandate-school-bus-seatbelt-law/story?id=9999072 (noting that school-bus industry 
associations have raised arguments about cost and liability in opposition to the installation of seat 
belts in school buses). 
 42. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 432–33 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (detailing a 
pesticide manufacturer’s refusal to comply with labeling requirements). 
 43. See Barclift, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that effective CSR requires decision making 
that balances profit maximization against moral and ethical obligations). 
 44. See Sheehy, supra note 35, at 51–52; see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE 
IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 4–5 (2001) (describing the multitude of costs 
produced by irresponsible corporate actions). 
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owes to its shareholders and including duties to employees, suppliers, and the 
surrounding community.45   
In contrast, CSR opponents argue that excessive regulation stifles creativity 
and competitiveness.46  Additionally, opponents assert that regulatory solutions 
are burdensome and inefficient.47  They maintain that market-based corrections 
result in efficient solutions that benefit all of society, not just corporations’ 
shareholders.48    
Both common law49 and statutory50 rules benefit corporate enterprises.  It 
seems reasonable, then, that in exchange for the privilege of operating a 
business in corporate form, the free transferability of shares, and the perpetual 
existence of the corporate entity, corporations should be held accountable to 
the public and recognize that they owe the public a duty of good faith, fairness, 
and honesty in their decisions and actions.  However, without legislation either 
mandating responsible conduct or incentivizing responsible conduct through 
economic means, corporations will not alter their modus operandi.51  Although 
legal, acting solely in the name of profit maximization is irresponsible and 
counterproductive to society’s best interests.  Legislatures must give 
corporations legal incentives to act with due regard for society and to take 
immediate and affirmative steps to minimize externalities.  Corporations often 
take corrective action only in response to governmental pressure, rather than in 
response to market pressure.52  
                                                            
 45. Afra Afsharipour, Directors as Trustees of the Nation? India’s Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Social Responsibility Reform Efforts, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 955, 1014 (2011). 
 46. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part II), 
104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 421, 423 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
colloquy/2010/15/LRColl2010n15Arewa.pdf (contending that additional regulations on 
corporations should be avoided and suggesting that current regulations, such as the  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, have reduced the competitiveness of U.S. companies). 
 47. Id. 
 48. IS THE GOOD CORPORATION DEAD? SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, 
at ix (John W. Houck & Oliver F. Williams eds., 1996) (articulating economist Milton 
Friedman’s view that ethical and social values are unrelated, and even harmful, to economic 
decisions). 
 49. The common law business judgment rule is “designed to protect the wide latitude 
conferred on a board of directors in handling the affairs of the corporate enterprise.  The rule 
refers to the judicial policy of deferring to the business judgment of corporate directors in the 
exercise of their broad discretion in making corporate decisions.”  3A FLETCHER, supra note 3,  
§ 1036. 
 50. See 17 C.F.R. § 120.14a-8 (2011) (providing the parameters for corporations’ 
acceptance and rejection of shareholder proposals). 
 51. See MITCHELL, supra note 44, at 11 (stating that legislative reforms are necessary to 
“give corporations incentives to care about the rest of us”). 
 52. Cf. John V. Jacobi, Competition Law’s Role in Health Care Quality, 11 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 45, 70–71 (2002) (contending that in the context of healthcare, market pressures alone 
are insufficient to enhance quality and that government regulation is needed). 
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II.  THE RELENTLESS PURSUIT OF PROFIT  
At the turn of the twentieth century, many began to embrace the concept of 
maximizing shareholder value as the justification for corporate actions and 
decisions.53  In 1919, the Michigan Supreme Court decided the now-famous 
case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,54 a seminal decision in American 
jurisprudence which many often cite for the proposition that the increase of 
shareholder value is the overriding goal of a corporation.55  This case centered 
on Ford’s decision to forego paying a special dividend to its shareholders.56  
The plaintiffs, who owned 2000 shares of Ford stock, filed suit against Ford 
Motor Company and claimed that they were not adequately represented on 
Ford’s board of directors, which was allegedly “dominated and controlled” by 
Henry Ford, Ford’s president and majority shareholder.57  The plaintiffs 
particularly took issue with Henry Ford’s proclamation that “it [is] to be the 
settled policy of the company not to pay in the future any special dividends, 
but to put back into the business for the future all of the earnings of the 
company, other than the regular dividend of five per cent.”58  The plaintiffs 
challenged his unilateral alteration of future dividend policy and opposed his 
statement of public benevolence because they claimed that his decision 
adversely affected their interests as shareholders.59   
Ford’s declaration of a change in dividend policy came at a financially 
inexcusable moment for Ford Motor Company, which had just finished its 
most profitable year.60  To illustrate, during this time, the company expected an 
annual profit of over $60 million.61  It held over $132 million in assets, which 
included approximately $54 million of cash on hand, against total liabilities 
and capital stock of $20 million, resulting in a surplus of approximately $112 
million.62  By any reasonable measure, the company was in a comfortable 
position to pay the special dividend without injury to its declaration of social 
benevolence.63  
                                                            
 53. See supra Part I; see also Smith, supra note 33, at 278, 308–09. 
 54. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 55. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 
(1998) (noting that the idea of shareholder primacy—that “corporate directors have a fiduciary 
duty to make decisions that are in the best interests of its shareholders”—is most often attributed 
to Dodge).  Professor D. Gordon Smith maintains that the correct interpretation of Dodge is one 
that addresses the rights of an oppressed minority shareholder.  Id. at 279. 
 56. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671. 
 57. Id. at 670–71. 
 58. Id. at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Ford asserted that with the company’s 
additional revenue, he intended “to employ . . . more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial 
system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes.”  Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 683. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 685. 
2012] Responsible Profitability? Not on My Balance Sheet! 659 
 
The court did not disregard the strength of Ford Motor Company’s financial 
position, as it ultimately ordered the company to pay the dividend.64  In  
oft-quoted language, the Dodge court reasoned, 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end.  The discretion of directors is to be exercised 
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote 
them to other purposes.65  
This language gained currency, and courts and scholars still cite it as the 
justification for maximizing shareholder value.66 
Although the Michigan Supreme Court rejected Ford’s attempt at social 
responsibility in Dodge, it referenced several cases relied on by Ford that 
actually support the notion of CSR.67  For example, in Taunton v. Royal 
Insurance Co., a shareholder of Royal Insurance Company challenged the 
board of directors’ decision to pay for losses resulting from a gunpowder 
explosion despite the fact that the insurance policies excluded such accidents 
from coverage.68  The record establishes that the explosion damaged  
eighty-one insured houses, and that although the directors agreed to pay 
claims, the board denied having a legal obligation to make such payments.69  
At the time Royal Insurance Company made its payments, the practice of 
making payments not required by law or policy was accepted among insurance 
companies under the rationale that “it was for the advantage of a company to 
deal liberally with customers, even to the extent of paying losses not strictly 
within the of terms their policies.”70  The court stated that this was a “matter[] 
within the discretion of the board . . . to settl[e] claims; and even if the 
payments be called gratuities, it makes no difference if they are gratuities 
conducive to the successful conduct of the legitimate business of the 
                                                            
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 684 (emphasis added). 
 66. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: 
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423–25 (1993); Kenneth B. Davis, 
Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain—A Survey 
of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 7–8 (1988); Robert 
Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for 
Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 3 (2010). 
 67. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (citing Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); People 
ex rel. Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909); Steinway v. 
Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896); Taunton v. Royal Ins. Co., (1864) 71 
Eng. Rep. 413 (Ch.); 2 Hem. & M. 135). 
 68. Tauton, 71 Eng. Rep. at 413. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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company.”71  The court recognized that company funds must be used for only 
legitimate business purposes, but that boards of directors must be free to make 
decisions as to what actions are in the best interests of the company.72  
Therefore, the Taunton court held that a board of directors may legitimately 
make voluntary and non-contractually binding payments in the interests of the 
company because such payments contributed to the company’s overall 
success.73 
The Dodge court also referenced Hawes v. Oakland, another case in which a 
corporation acted for the public’s benefit notwithstanding a shareholder’s 
complaint.74  In this case, the defendant water company supplied the City of 
Oakland with free water for nonessential purposes.75  The plaintiff-shareholder 
filed a suit demanding that the company “limit the supply of [free] water . . . to 
cases of fire or other great necessity.”76  The plaintiff maintained that the 
practice of supplying water free of charge caused “great loss and injury of the 
company, to the diminution of the dividends . . . and to the decrease in the 
value of their stock.”77 
The Court dismissed the case because it found that the directors were acting 
within their authority and that the plaintiff lacked standing.78  By dismissing 
the complaint, the Court recognized the directors’ authority to make business 
decisions in the corporation’s interest, even when such corporate action 
furthers a public interest and not just shareholder wealth.79   
Although the concept of maximizing shareholder profitability is readily 
understood, it is questionable whether so broad a judicial application80 of the 
shareholder-maximization theory subsequent to Dodge v. Ford is justified 
when considered against these cases.   
                                                            
 71. Id. at 415. 
 72. Id. at 414. 
 73. Id. at 415. 
 74. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 75. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 451 (1881). 
 76. Id.  The Court noted that 
[t]he foundation of the complaint is that the city of Oakland claims at the hands of the 
company water, without compensation, for all municipal purposes whatever, including 
watering the streets, public squares and parks, flushing sewers, and the like, whereas it 
is only entitled to receive water free of charge in cases of fire or other great necessity. 
Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 462.  Discussing early derivative-lawsuit principles, the Court stated that a 
shareholder must show that the directors are exceeding the scope of their established authority, 
considering or engaging in a fraudulent transaction, acting in their individual interests as opposed 
to the corporation’s interest, or engaging in an illegal course of action.  Id. at 460. 
 79. See id. at 461–62. 
 80. See generally, e.g., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 
(illustrating the success of minority shareholders in compelling a dividend). 
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A.  Profit: An Evolving and Expanding Definition 
No other social device has garnered as much attention as the determination 
and the measurement of profit.81  Governments measure profit to tax it, 
companies measure profit to gauge performance, and the average person 
measures profit to determine disposable income.82  Profit is the fundamental 
tenet of capitalism.83  
During the pre-industrial era, early conceptions of profit were relatively 
simple in format.84  Corporations did not use profits as the basis for decision 
making or as a benchmark for evaluating performance.85  One commentator 
noted that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century accountants lacked interest in 
profits and that “an examination of the ledgers of British businessmen has 
produced evidence of woeful ineptitude or lack of interest in profit 
measurement—probably both.”86  Rather, corporations used accounting purely 
for record keeping.87  Historically, “the main demand for accounting data came 
from management concerned with internal resource allocation rather than 
absentee shareholders keen to assess the overall performance of the 
enterprise.”88  Unlike modern practices, there were no income-acceleration 
techniques or extraordinary charges associated with the calculation of 
profitability during this era.89  Early conceptions of shareholder profitability 
                                                            
 81. See, e.g., C.J. Foreman, A Division Among Theorists in Their Analysis of Profit, 34 Q.J. 
ECON. 114, 114–17 (1919) (discussing the differences between the three major theories of profit 
and demonstrating the breadth of the debate). 
 82. See, e.g., Richard Winchester, Corporations that Weren’t: The Taxation of Firm Profits 
in Historical Perspective, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 501 (2010) (discussing corporate 
profits in the context of the U.S. tax scheme). 
 83. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Financialism: A Lecture Delivered at Creighton University 
School of Law, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323, 325 (2010) (“[T]he fundamental purpose of 
capitalism [i]s a system for the production of goods and services and wealth creation and 
distribution.”). 
 84. See J.R. EDWARDS, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 77 (1989). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 77, 79.  Professor J.R. Edwards notes that even as industry began to develop, 
assets and liabilities were excluded from accounting records, profit calculations were haphazard, 
profit-and-loss accounts contained items that should not have been included, prepayments and 
accruals were ignored, and the general account contained items that should have been included in 
the capital account or the profit-and-loss account.  Id. at 79–80. 
 87. Id. at 80; see also ELDON S. HENDERIKSEN, ACCOUNTING THEORY 39 (3d ed. 1977) 
(“In earlier periods, bookkeeping provided information mainly for managerial uses . . . .”). 
 88. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 80. 
 89. See id. at 89.  Another commentator describes the simplicity of determining profitability 
at the beginning of the twentieth century: 
When, finally, the mine is producing, the revenue from it is spent (a) in paying for 
labour and other working costs at ordinary market rates; (b) in paying interest on the 
working capital at ordinary market rates, or something more; (c) in surplus profit, 
which goes to the prospector, the original subscribers to the syndicate, but chiefly to the 
financial controlling house.” 
R.A. Lehfeldt, On Financiers’ Profits, 80 ECON. J. 551, 556 (1910). 
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were restricted to a consideration of dividend payment policy or to an analysis 
of a return of capital.90   
The need for measuring profit evolved as business activity, business 
structures, and financial theory grew in sophistication.91  Measuring profit 
allowed the “business manager to decide whether resources were gainfully 
employed.”92  Moreover, measuring profits enabled corporations “to identify 
the balance legally available for the payment of dividends . . . [and also served] 
as the basis for reporting to creditors and absentee owners.”93  
The determination of corporate profitability during the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century was a comparatively modest and 
unsophisticated process.94  During this period, profitability was defined as the 
excess of revenues over expenses.95  Unlike modern profit theory,96 there were 
no sophisticated measurement conventions in use during this era.97 Instead, the 
determination of profit was closer to a cash-basis reckoning than an  
accrual-basis determination.98  The concept of profit among shareholders 
focused on a strong corporate dividend policy;99 however, profits were to be 
distributed to shareholders only after due consideration of the company’s 
                                                            
 90. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 111. 
 91. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 33, 39–40 (stating that “[a]ccounting developed 
historically as the needs arose, and changes occurred gradually in accounting techniques and 
concepts. But new accounting practices have been necessary to keep pace with changing 
economic institutions and relationships and the changing objectives of accounting”). 
 92. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 76. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 104 (noting that before 1930, accounting was 
based on rules, rather than on basic principles). 
 95. See EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 77 (noting that business managers gauged profitability 
based on the amount of cash on hand). 
 96. Modern profit theory consists of various concepts, including capital-asset pricing 
models, the Black-Scholes model, the efficient capital market hypothesis, and present value.  See 
JAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., FINANCIAL & MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING: THE BASIS FOR BUSINESS 
DECISIONS 454–55 (15th ed. 2010) (defining present value); Joseph E. Bachelder, Comments on 
Pay Without Performance, 30 J. CORP. L. 777, 780 (2005) (describing the Black-Scholes model); 
Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions 
of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 475 (1997) (commenting on the 
capital-asset pricing model and the efficient capital market hypothesis). 
 97. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 33, 104. 
 98. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 77.  Accrual-method accounting realizes income 
when the taxpayer has earned the income or possesses a legal right to it.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 22 (9th ed. 2009).  Cash-basis accounting realizes income when the taxpayer has 
actually received the income.  Id.; see also Comm’r v. N. Tex. Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 12–14 
(1930) (articulating the difference in tax liability generated by the use of either accrual or  
cash-basis accounting methods). 
 99. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 496 (1894) (“The term ‘dividend,’ in 
its technical as well as in its ordinary acceptation means that portion of its profits which the 
corporation, by its directory, sets apart for ratable division among its shareholders.” (citing 
Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76 (1875))); see supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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financial needs.100  Other financial products like credit markets, derivative 
transactions, and international markets were not in contemplation during this 
nascent era.  The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression led 
Congress to pass the Securities Exchange Act of 1933101 and the Exchange Act 
of 1934,102 and to create the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
1934.103  During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, investors 
considered dividend policy and return of capital as primary factors when 
making an investment decision.104  The Dodge court recognized that 
shareholders’ desire to obtain dividends created tension between shareholders 
and management and remarked that “‘[p]rofits earned by a corporation may be 
divided among its shareholders, but it is not a violation of the charter if they 
are allowed to accumulate and remain invested in the company’s business.’”105 
As one early measurement of profits, cash-basis accounting gained 
recognition from legislatures and courts because it helped protect the rights of 
creditors who dealt with corporations.106  In response, courts and legislatures 
fashioned several devices to protect the rights of creditors.  First, under certain 
circumstances, directors could be held personally liable for making 
distributions and draining the corporation of cash.107  Second, in contrast to 
modern practices that significantly reduce par values, which have been 
recorded at one cent,108 par values during the nineteenth century were 
                                                            
 100. Mobile, 153 U.S. at 496–97. 
 101. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77 (2006)). 
 102. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
 103. Id. § 4(a), 48 Stat. at 885; see also The Investors Advocate: How the SEC Protects 
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC.  
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
 104. See, e.g., Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 131, 131 (Mich. 1890) (“It is 
undoubtedly true that the ultimate object for which every corporation of the character of the one 
under consideration is formed, is the payment of dividends to its individual members.”). 
 105. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919) (quoting VICTOR 
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 447 (2d ed. 1886), 
available at http://ia600400.us.archive.org/0/items/cu31924019224603/cu31924019224603.pdf). 
 106. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 177; see also 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. 
THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 8:16, at 8-79 to -80 
(rev. 3d ed. 2011) (noting that many early statutory requirements were aimed to benefit creditors). 
 107. Hunter, 47 N.W. at 133–34 (discussing a Michigan state statute stating that “if the 
directors of any such corporation shall declare or pay a dividend when the corporation is 
insolvent, or any dividend the payment of which would render it insolvent, knowing such 
corporation to be insolvent, or that the payment of such dividend would render it so, the directors 
assenting thereto shall be jointly and severally liable, in an action founded on this statute, for all 
debts due from such corporation at the time of paying or declaring such dividend”); see also 29 
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Liability of a Director to a Corporation for Mismanagement  § 6 
(1995 & Supp. 2011) (discussing prohibitions on corporate waste). 
 108. 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, 
RESTRUCURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS § 4.4 (2d ed. 1995). 
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significantly higher in amount109 and were viewed as a device to protect 
creditors’ interests by assuring them that a minimum amount of capital was 
available.110  Third, courts were ready to invoke the ultra vires doctrine111 to 
protect creditors by finding that corporations acted outside the scope of 
authority, under the belief that corporations must abide by their narrowly 
approved objectives.112   
Another practice in measuring profit was for contracting parties to define 
profit by mutual agreement to determine how much capital was available to the 
shareholders for an eventual distribution.113  For example, in Park v. Grant 
Locomotive Works, the plaintiff-shareholders brought a suit to compel a larger 
dividend than the one the directors were prepared to issue.114  At the time the 
lawsuit was filed, the defendant-corporation was insolvent.115  The 
corporation’s shareholders and creditors had entered into an agreement to 
recapitalize the insolvent corporation intending to restore the corporation to its 
business function.116  The agreement provided for the cancellation of 
mortgages to strip the corporation of encumbrances and pay the corporation’s 
debt to creditors in stock.117  The terms of the agreement also provided that “all 
the net profits of the company, after the payment of taxes, insurance, and the 
necessary amount for the proper maintenance of the property of the company 
in its present condition and capacity, shall be divided annually among the 
stockholders.”118  The newly reconstituted group of shareholders then sued for 
a larger dividend than that which had been announced and claimed that 
approximately $205,000 remained to be distributed.119   
As the court examined the shareholders’ claim to make a determination of 
net profit, it identified two alternatives.120  It recognized that when a contract 
controls the matter, the terms of the contract should operate as a limitation on 
the directors’ discretion and thereby control the disposition of the matter.121  
                                                            
 109. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 106, § 8.16, at 8-80. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1733 (2004) (“Corporate acts . . . which are outside 
the scope of the general express and implied authority of the corporation are said to take ultra 
vires.” (footnote omitted)). 
 112. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with 
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 
1302 (2001) (noting the importance of the ultra vires doctrine in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries). 
 113. Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 3 A. 162, 164–65 (N.J. Ch. 1885). 
 114. Id. at 163. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 163, 166. 
 120. Id. at 165–66. 
 121. Id. 
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However, “[i]n cases where the power of the directors of the corporation is 
without limitation and free from restraint, they are at liberty to exercise a very 
liberal discretion as to what disposition shall be made of the gains of . . . the 
corporation.”122  The court’s observation was significant because it confirmed 
that the determination of profit, if not fixed by contract, was within the 
reasonable discretion of the board of directors.123 
The innovation of a standard measure of accounting, namely, generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), did not exist when cases like Park 
and Dodge were decided.124  Arguably, GAAP facilitates the measurement of 
profits, which thereby enables companies to report profitability results to its 
shareholders.125  Before GAAP, no clear uniform standard of measuring 
income, expense, or profitability existed.126  Although there was a sense as to 
what constituted profits, as these cases demonstrate, no clear consensus existed 
as to the various methods of accounting to be used when determining profit.127  
The determination of profit has not been an easy task.  An early tax treatise 
describes the challenges faced by individuals when determining profit because 
“profit” was not comprehensively defined.128  For example, uncertainty existed 
when recording and reporting asset appreciation and asset depreciation—two 
financial events that affect the determination of profit.129    
Even classical economists could not agree on the definition of profit.  Adam 
Smith, for example, focused on the productivity of labor when he defined 
profit as payment for a combination of an entrepreneur’s risks and services.130  
Others described profit as income in the form of return to the entrepreneur.131  
Surprisingly, the clearest articulation of profit comes not from within the 
disciplines of economics or accounting, but from the legal community.   Judge 
Richard Posner states that “profits, are not facts, but rather are the conclusions 
                                                            
 122. Id. at 165. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 239–40; see also Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCT. 
STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml#mission (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) 
(stating that the Financial Accounting Standards Board was created in 1973 and tasked with 
setting standards of accounting in the private sector, including establishing the GAAP in the 
United States). 
 125. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 53–58, 81. 
 126. See id. at 33–73. 
 127. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 239. 
 128. THOMAS GOLD FROST, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW OF 1913, at 14 
(1913). 
 129. Id. at 14–15 (“[T]he word ‘profit’ ordinarily means the excess of returns over 
expenditures and may or may not, according to circumstances, include in the returns any increase 
in value of the capital and in the expenditures any depreciation of capital.”). 
 130. Foreman, supra note 81, at 115; see also ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 156 
(Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1981). 
 131. See ALVIN SAUNDERS JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 238 (1909). 
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of a reasoning process that is based on the rationale for the rule and that as a 
result turns the rule into an implicit standard.”132  
B.  Financial Theory Comes of Age 
Modern financial theory progressed from a simple three-factor economic 
analysis of wages, profits, and rent133 into a complex, multi-variable economic 
analysis that utilizes differential equations to determine profitability.134  This 
shift ultimately affects how shareholders evaluate corporations and their 
directors. 
The post-World War II environment prompted a robust period of economic 
growth.135  As a result of the increased economic activity, corporations grew in 
number and economic strength.136  An explosion of economic theories sought 
to explain the sudden development of the American economy.137  During the 
last half of the twentieth century, “prodigious empirical and theoretical 
research and commentary has provided an economic perspective on the 
operation of capital markets.”138  
The new economic theories included highly evolved economic concepts 
describing, for example, how shareholders value stock prices,139 how market 
participants behave,140 and how costs are to be measured.141  These new 
theories influenced corporate behavior.142  They also influenced how courts 
analyzed corporate decisions.  For example, in 1970, a paper by Professor 
Eugene Fama hypothesized that stock prices that incorporate publicly available 
information influence how market participants respond to public 
                                                            
 132. MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 133. Arthur T. Hadley, Interest and Profits, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 337, 
337 (1893). 
 134. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 135. The Economy: “We Are All Keynesians Now,” TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, at 64, 64. 
 136. Marty Harris & Ken Szeflinski, Celebrating Ninety Years of SOI: Selected Corporate 
Data, 1916-2004, STAT. INCOME BULL. 279, 284–85 (2007), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07cobulhis.pdf. 
 137. See infra notes 143–56 and accompanying text. 
 138. Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the 
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 373 (1984). 
 139. See infra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Jeffery S. Glasser, Capital Asset 
Pricing Model: Risk Valuation, Judicial Interpretation, and Market Bias, 50 BUS. L. 687, 689 
(1995). (“Financial economic theory is extremely instructive in uncovering the various 
components of a security’s valuation, one component of which is risk. The greater the risk, the 
less valuable the security; the lower the risk, the more valuable the security.”). 
 140. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 141. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 142. See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 54 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 927, 933 (2007) (observing the influence of accounting on corporate behavior and 
examining the underlying reasons). 
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information.143  This theory came to be known as the efficient capital market 
hypothesis (ECMH).144 The ECMH directly influenced the Supreme Court’s 
decision eighteen years later when, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, it reasoned that 
“[r]ecent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the 
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly 
available information.”145  The ECMH quickly gained popularity as courts and 
markets accepted research indicating its accurate representation of the impact 
of public information in stock prices.146  
Another influential financial device is the capital-asset pricing model 
(CAPM).147  Financial experts use the CAPM to determine a company’s cost of 
capital.148  A higher cost of capital negatively affects profits.149  The CAPM 
attempts to identify a risk-free rate for money and a risk premium that would 
be demanded for investment in the particular enterprise at issue.150  Courts 
have acknowledged the validity and importance of the CAPM theory.151   For 
example, the court in Cede & Co. noted that the CAPM approach is a 
“technique[] or method[] . . . generally considered acceptable . . . in the 
financial community.”152 
Additional financial innovations include the Black-Scholes model and 
present-value analysis.  The Black-Scholes model is widely used to value stock 
                                                            
 143. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 
25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). 
 144. See Carol R. Goforth, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis—An Inadequate 
Justification for the Fraud-On-The-Market Presumption, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 895, 895 n.6 
(1992) (describing the basis for ECMH theory). 
 145. 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).  The Supreme Court recognized that “‘[o]f all recent 
developments in financial economics, the efficient capital market hypothesis (‘ECMH’) has 
achieved the widest acceptance by the legal culture.’”  Id. at 253 n.4 (quoting Ronald J. Gilson  
& Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549 (1984)). 
 146. Dennis, supra note 138, at 374–75. 
 147. Glasser, supra note 139, at 690–92. 
 148. Douglas O. Edwards, (Systemic) Risk and Taxation, 31 VA. TAX. REV. 331, 354 (2011); 
see also Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial Theory and Transfer Pricing, 
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 666–67 (2002). 
 149. See Pamela Peterson Drake, The Cost of Capital 1 (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://educ.jmu.edu/~drakepp/principles/module7/coc.pdf (indicating that the lower the risk of 
producing income, the lower a corporation’s cost of capital will be). 
 150. See Ackerman & Chorvat, supra note 148, at 666–68; see also Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *28 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (“[The CAPM] 
model estimates the cost of company debt (on an after tax basis for a company expected to be 
able to utilize the tax deductibility of interest payments) by estimating the expected future cost of 
borrowing; it estimates the future cost of equity through a multi-factor equation and then 
proportionately weighs and combines the cost of equity and cost of debt to determine a cost of 
capital.”). 
 151. See, e.g., In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 492 (Del. Ch. 1991) 
(confirming the use of the CAPM method for determining the cost of capital). 
 152. Cede & Co., 1990 WL 161084, at *28 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 
713 (Del. 1983)); see, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 349, 368 (1986). 
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options.153  Present-value analysis measures “the time value of money”154 and 
is used by corporate management to place a current value on a stream of future 
payments.155  Present-value analysis figured prominently during the last half of 
the twentieth century as companies increasingly analyzed cash flows and 
liabilities on a present-value basis.156   
These financial theories did not go unnoticed by the corporate community, 
lawyers, or regulators.  Regulatory filings with the SEC routinely included 
reference to these financial theories.157  Moreover, corporations repeatedly cite 
to these theories in their communications to shareholders and the public.158   
At the same time that financial theory was growing in sophistication, 
accounting theory also began to evolve by moving away from historical cost 
accounting toward fair-value accounting.159  Fair-value accounting is the 
                                                            
 153. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 38 n.8 (Del. 2006).  In In re Walt 
Disney Co., a compensation consultant applied the Black-Scholes model to assess the 
reasonableness of the executive stock option.  Id. 
 154. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 96, at 454. 
 155. See id. at 454–55.  One of the earliest judicial applications of the present-value concept 
is found in In re Jamieson’s Estate, 15 Pa. D. 618 (Pa. Orphan’s Ct. 1905).  The court defined the 
present value of an annuity as “such a sum that, if invested and put at interest, it will, with a 
proportionate part taken from the fund yearly to make out the annuity, yield the required amount 
of it annually, the whole fund being exhausted during the expectancy of life of the annuitant.”  Id. 
at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A Texas state appellate court likened present value to 
“reverse interest” and explained that “[a] present value discount is, as it were, reverse-interest: it 
subtracts from the sum of payments to be received in the future the interest that would be earned 
on that sum if it were paid in full at present and held until each payment came due.”  Lau Family 
P’ship v. Nirtag U.S., Inc., No. 08-01-00022-cv, 2002 WL 997741, at *3 (Tex. App. May 16, 
2002) (quoting PRC Kentron, Inc. v. First City Ctr. Assocs., II, 762 S.W.2d 279, 290 n.11 (Tex. 
App. 1988)).  The court added that “if the interest rate and the present value discount rate are the 
same, the present value of a series of periodic payments—past payments with interest and future 
payments discounted—is the same at any point during the entire period.”  Id. (quoting PRC 
Kentron, Inc., 762 S.W.2d at 290 n.11). 
 156. See Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a 
Proposal for Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1992). 
 157. See, e.g., AT&T INC., FORM 10-K 72 (2010), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=113088&p=irol-SECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2lyLmludC53ZXN0bGF-
3YnVzaW5lc3MuY29tL2RvY3VtZW50L3YxLzAwMDA3MzI3MTctMTEtMDAwMDE0L3htb
A%3d%3d (referencing the Black-Scholes theory); COCA-COLA CO., UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 10-K 48, 124 (2010), available at 
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/investors/pdfs/form_10K_2010.pdf (mentioning the 
present-value and Black-Scholes methodologies);. 
 158. FORD MOTOR CO., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 88 (2010), available at 
http://corporate.ford.com/doc/ir_2010_annual_report.pdf. (mentioning Black-Scholes and 
present-value concepts); KELLOGG CO., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2010), available at  
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/K/1523434307x0x448599/a9b46c48-9b3b-41d4-9350-e9-
02636df788/kelloggs_2010_ar.pdf (same). 
 159. See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting, The Emergence of Fair 
Value as the Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839, 1840–41 (1996) 
(observing the shift from cost accounting to fair-value accounting in the twentieth century).  Cost 
accounting refers to the method of accounting “[w]hen market prices are unavailable, [and] a 
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process of reporting the hypothetical fair market value of an asset or liability, 
as well as hypothetical gains and losses.160  Proponents of fair-value 
accounting argue that this approach “provide[s] investors (and to a lesser 
extent business and policy makers) with accurate and clear information on a 
company’s net assets and operating performance.”161  Critics, however, argue 
that fair-value accounting is subjective and provides management with an 
incentive to engage in gains trading activities.162  Fair-value accounting also 
provides corporate management with the justification to use an array of value 
ranges that ultimately affect the profitability of a corporation.163  For example, 
a management decision to categorize a security as a held-to-maturity security 
instead of a trading security affects whether the corporation records additional 
income or loss.164  The choice of available accounting methods is not new.  
What is new, however, is the change in philosophy from the historical cost 
basis of accounting to the malleable fair-value basis of accounting.165  
One must be mindful of the subtle, yet significant shift in determining 
profitability, a shift whereby the notion of profit expanded over time.  In  
pre-industrial organizations, the owner was also the manager of the business 
and therefore knew with a high degree of certainty the financial welfare of the 
business enterprise.166  However, the corporate form, which allowed for 
separation of ownership from management,167 gained popularity, and the 
notion of profit expanded to include more variables, such as opportunity 
costs.168  As the twentieth century drew to a close, the concept of profit 
continued to expand to include hypothetical gains and losses in the form of 
                                                                                                                                         
company values the investment and reports it at cost in periods subsequent to  
acquisition . . . . Companies recognize dividends when received.  They value the portfolio and 
report it at acquisition cost.  Companies only recognize gains or losses after selling the 
securities.”  DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 848 n.7 (12th ed. 2007). 
 160. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE: FAIR VALUE 
MEASUREMENT (TOPIC 820): AMENDMENTS TO ACHIEVE COMMON FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT 
AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN U.S. GAAP AND IFRSS 10 (2011), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blob
where=1175822486936&blobheader=application%2Fpdf (“[F]air value measurement  
[attempts] . . . to estimate the price at which an orderly transaction to sell the asset or to transfer 
the liability would take place between market participants at the measurement date under current 
market conditions . . . .”); see also Summary of Statement No. 157, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS 
BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum157.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 161. PETER M. FASS ET AL., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK § 3:87 (2011). 
 162. KIESO ET AL., supra note 159, at 860–61. 
 163. Id. at 839. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 166. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 77. 
 167. See GEVURTZ, supra note 38, at 4. 
 168. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 96, at 931 (defining opportunity cost as “the benefit that 
could have been obtained by pursuing an alternative course of action”). 
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fair-value accounting.169  Every period of economic progress seems to bring 
with it an expansion in the notion of profit.170  As the notion of profit has 
expanded, investors, seeking to exploit profit opportunities, have persuaded 
legislators to adopt hybrid entities such as limited-liability partnerships 
(LLPs),171 limited-liability companies (LLCs),172 and limited-liability limited 
partnerships (LLLPs),173 which offer a narrow scope of liability and thereby 
widen the gap of responsibility.174 
III.  THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL LEGAL THEORIES IN PROVIDING 
ADEQUATE PUBLIC PROTECTIONS OR CORPORATE INCENTIVES  
It is fair to ask why another structure regulating corporate behavior is 
necessary if there are already laws in place.  Law, as a social institution for 
regulating behavior, is imperfect.175  Because of the value society places on 
policies like freedom to contract,176 freedom from undue restraint,177 and free 
will,178 imperfections in the social institution of the law are inevitable.  
If the goal of the law is to provide justice, equity, and efficiency, then this 
goal is compromised in certain contexts when one considers that individual 
                                                            
 169. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.  A gnawing question to consider: “If 
accounting theory, even after much academic and professional debate, boils down to management 
discretion among competing accounting principles, how much confidence can regulators or the 
public have in any financial reporting system?” 
 170. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1460 (1989). 
 171. An LLP is defined as a “partnership in which a partner is not liable for a negligent act 
committed by another partner or by an employee not under the partner’s supervision.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 1230. 
 172. An LLC is defined as “[a] company—statutorily authorized in certain states—that is 
characterized by limited liability, management by members or managers, and limitations on 
ownership transfer.”  Id. at 319. 
 173. See Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Registered Limited Liability Limited 
Partnerships, in LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW CURRENT THROUGH 
2011, ¶ 15.03[4][a] (2011) (describing the benefits of LLLP status). 
 174. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using Comparative and Transnational Law to Teach 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 39, 49–51 
(2011) (examining LLCs and concerns about CSR in the context of multinational businesses). 
 175. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (2007) (“[C]ontract law, like all 
social institutions, does not work perfectly . . . .”). 
 176. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 720 (2011) (defining “freedom of contract” to mean 
the freedom “to make whatever contracts they please as long as the contracts are legal in all 
respects and not contrary to public policy, and as long as no fraud or deception is practiced”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Charles Dougherty, Note, Who Needs Contract Law?—A Critical Look at 
Contractual Indemnification (or Lack Thereof) in FHAA and ADA “Design and Construct” 
Cases, 44 IND. L. REV. 545, 545 (2011) (observing the link between free will and the freedom of 
contract). 
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plaintiffs are subjected to enhanced procedural requirements.179  These 
enhanced requirements have made it increasingly difficult for legitimate 
plaintiffs to proceed against corporate defendants.180 
Corporations have successfully defended many cases in which serious injury 
or death occurred.181  Several reasons account for this phenomenon.  First, 
corporate defendants have structural devices in the forms of statutes and legal 
precedent that provide them with an initial legal barrier.182  Second, corporate 
defendants have an enormous financial advantage over plaintiffs, which 
enables a corporate defendant to deploy considerable legal resources to stave 
off a plaintiff’s legal threats.183  Third, as times passes, individual plaintiffs 
become personally invested in the outcome of litigation from a psychological, 
emotional, and financial perspective, whereas corporate defendants can remain 
detached from the proceedings and dispassionately concern themselves solely 
with the financial implications of an adverse judgment.184 
A.  The Role of Tort Law in CSR 
Torts cause harm to victims and society by diminishing the victim’s quality 
of life and increasing suffering.185  Correspondingly, tort law serves as a tool to 
fill the public-responsibility gap left by private ordering and government 
                                                            
 179. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No.  
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (aiming to curb 
abusive litigation in securities class-action cases by increasing procedural requirements); see also 
Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During 
the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2006) (surveying the ways 
in which the PSLRA attempts “to target the perceived abuse by plaintiffs’ lawyers in class action 
securities litigation”). 
 180. See Amy L. Craiger, Note, From Conceivable to Impossible: The Hurdles Plaintiffs 
Must Overcome When Pleading Section 11 and Section 12(A) Securities Claims, 5 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 549, 549–51 (2011) (emphasizing the difficulties faced by plaintiffs trying 
to bring legitimate claims in the face of strict procedural requirements). 
 181. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 182. Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85, 86 (1880) (discussing the 
broad authority held by corporate directors and noting that “[t]he only limitation upon the 
judgment or discretion of the directors is such as the corporation by its by-laws and votes shall 
impose”). 
 183. See Richard B. Bernstein, Mapping Legal History’s “Middle Ground,” 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 675, 685–86 (1991) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: 
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992)) (discussing a 
corporate defendant’s significant resources as compared to an individual plaintiff’s). 
 184. See id.; cf. Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money”: A Theory on Misconceptions of 
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 721–22 (2007) (noting that plaintiffs’  
extra-legal objectives for litigation, such as “dignity and respect after the injury, [the] inability to 
be heard, refusal to listen, dismissal and victim blaming,” did not decrease over time). 
 185. David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 716 (1992). 
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regulation.186  It addresses the conduct of actors engaging in public behavior by 
deterring unreasonable conduct and compensating injured parties.187   
Tort law is designed to influence two distinct classes of behavior: impulsive 
conduct and deliberate conduct.188  Impulsive conduct is sudden and 
unexpected, and the actor does not think before reacting,189 whereas deliberate 
conduct is such that the actor contemplated the harm, although it was not 
necessarily intended.190   
Government action can influence deliberate behavior.  For example, 
government regulations requiring passenger air bags or seat belts ultimately 
forced the automobile industry to act.191  Without clear regulations and 
enforcement, corporations are reluctant to implement safety measures 
voluntarily because of the added cost;192 thus, manufacturers are faced with a 
Hobson’s choice: does the manufacturer absorb the cost or should the 
manufacturer pass the cost onto the consumer?  Manufacturers are sensitive to 
price increases because they generally translate into either lower profit margins 
for manufacturers, if manufacturers absorb the cost, or higher consumer prices 
if manufacturers pass on the cost.193  In any event, manufacturers are acutely 
sensitive to costs because they directly affect a firm’s profits and may create a 
competitive hindrance in price-sensitive markets.194  The reality of this 
decision-making process must not be lost on policymakers.  
                                                            
 186. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (5th ed. 
1984) (noting that tort law imposes liability on “socially unreasonable” conduct). 
 187. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 
115, 118 (1993). 
 188. Id. at 127–28. 
 189. Id. at 128. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240,  
§ 2508, 105 Stat. 1914, 2805 (codified in scattered sections of 23 and 49 U.S.C.); Safety Belt 
Child Restraint Laws, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.iihs.org/laws/safetybeltuse.aspx (noting that forty-nine states have laws requiring seat 
belts). 
 192. See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of  
Mexico . . . And the Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 391, 400–01 (2011) (detailing the efforts of BP to “systematically cut back on critical safety 
measures” in order to cut costs before the Exxon Valdez oil spill). 
 193. See, e.g., Business and Commodity Prices: Everyday Higher Prices, ECONOMIST, Feb. 
26, 2011, at 68, 68 (describing manufacturers’ decisions to pass on costs to consumers and the 
subsequent effects on business). 
 194. See CHARTERED INST. PERSONNEL & DEV., SUSTAINABLE ORGANISATION 
PERFORMANCE: WHAT REALLY MAKES THE DIFFERENCE? 19, 29 (2011), available at 
http://www.cipd.co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/69BF5AEA-7240-4F51-A437-BC165AA9B03E/0/Sustaina-
ble_organisation_performance_STF_interim_report.pdf (highlighting management’s cognizance 
of the pressure to reduce costs while also maintaining quality and safety). 
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Plaintiffs seeking to impose tort liability must prove each element of the 
claim.195  This is consistent with the American system of justice, which 
generally places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.196  However, plaintiffs 
with both nominal and costly claims may find barriers to pursuing their cases.  
Litigation expenses can easily run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
and attorney and expert-witness fees may make such a case cost-prohibitive for 
some plaintiffs.197  Plaintiffs with nominal claims also face challenges because 
plaintiffs’ lawyers tend not to take cases in which possible recovery is under 
$50,000.198  Such barriers to obtaining representation are akin to a de facto 
denial of protection for many potential plaintiffs who have suffered harm but 
are left with an unanswered injury.199   
Moreover, pursuing a tort theory, even in the face of sympathetic facts, is 
not necessarily a fait accompli.200  For example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., the plaintiff purchased a car for his wife as a gift.201  Shortly 
thereafter, his wife was injured while driving when the car suddenly swerved 
into a wall.202  The record indicates that the car had experienced no problem 
and she was driving the car at a moderate speed when she heard a loud noise 
and lost control of the car.203  Testimony from a bus operator who witnessed 
the accident confirmed that the car suddenly “veered at 90 degrees . . . and 
                                                            
 195. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 2 (2011). 
 196. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
 197. David M. Scott, Note, Non-Traditional Resolutions to Mass Tort Disputes Take a Hit as 
AIDS-Infected Hemophiliacs Bear the Cost of Judge Posner’s “Economic Justice,” 12 OHIO ST. 
J. DISP. RESOL. 159, 168–69 (1996).  One study calculated that in 2007, tort costs in the  
United States were $853 per capita and the total cost was $252 billion.  TOWERS PERRIN,  
2008 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=USA/2008/200811/2008_tort_costs_tren
ds.pdf. 
 198. Shuman, supra note 187, at 120 (citing Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything 
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 
1190–91 (1992)).  It is suggested that smaller claims in products liability and medical malpractice 
are usually not compensated by the legal system.  Id.  Usually, tort claims will be filed when the 
plaintiff has sustained serious injury as a result of a solvent defendant’s unsafe behavior.  Id. 
 199. See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access in Legal Representation: The Attack on the 
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 33, 35 (2000) (observing the 
inadequate amount of legal representation available to individuals in need of legal counsel); 
Shuman, supra note 189, at 119–20. 
 200. See Shuman, supra note 187, at 119–20 (stating that plaintiffs suffering minor tortious 
injuries may be “uncertain, ex ante, whether tortious behavior will result in a claim that triggers 
the deterrent function of tort law” given the perception that only conduct judged to require 
deterrence will permit eventual recovery). 
 201. 161 A.2d 69, 73 (N.J. 1960). 
 202. Id. at 75. 
 203. Id. 
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right into [a] wall.”204  The insurance adjuster opined that the accident “must 
have been due to mechanical defect or failure.”205 
The Henningsens sued Chrysler Corporation based on tort and contract 
claims.206  Despite the evidence supporting their negligence claims, the trial 
court dismissed the negligence counts by reasoning that “the proof was not 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case as to the negligence of either the 
manufacturer or the dealer.”207  Henningsen illustrates the challenges faced by 
plaintiffs when pursuing tort actions. 
Because courts seek to balance equity and efficiency when examining tort 
cases,208 the question inevitably arises, how should courts strike this balance 
while evaluating the relative risks and hardships faced by tort litigants?  Judge 
Learned Hand famously provided an answer in United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co.209  The fundamental issue in this case centered on how far a 
defendant’s duty to act and to prevent harm to others extends: is there an 
absolute duty to act always or is the duty relative and dependent on the 
circumstances?210  Judge Hand reasoned that  
[s]ince there are occasions when every vessel will break from her 
moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those 
about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide 
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The 
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting 
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.211  
Thus, Judge Hand adopted a relative duty of care by balancing the parties’ 
interests and taking into account varying circumstances, risks, and costs.212  
 
                                                            
 204. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 73. 
 207. Id. at 75.  The plaintiffs nonetheless prevailed at the trial-court level on their breach of 
warranty claims.  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision on those grounds and 
thus declined to express an opinion on the negligence claim.  Id. at 102. 
 208. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER 11 
(2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/46xx/doc4641/10-22-
tortreform-study.pdf. 
 209. 159 F.2d 169, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1947).  In Carroll, when the defendant failed to take 
adequate precautions to safeguard and secure an unmanned barge, the barge broke free from its 
moorings and damaged other ships before sinking and losing its cargo.  Id. at 171.  The barge 
owner, as plaintiff, argued that the harbor master had the authority to determine the sufficiency of 
the strength of the lines attaching the barge to the pier.  Id.  The defendant countered by arguing 
that the barge owner was negligent because he failed to leave a person on board the barge.  Id. 
 210. See id. at 173. 
 211. Id.  Judge Hand famously articulated his theory as a formula, analyzing whether burden 
(B) was less than injury (L) multiplied by probability (P).  Id. 
 212. Id. 
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Rationalizing costs and expenses was not a new phenomenon when the 
Second Circuit decided Carroll in 1947.213  Indeed, a new theory of accounting 
called cost accounting—“used for measurement of cost, assignment of cost to 
cost accounting periods, or allocation of cost to cost objectives”214—was 
beginning to gain acceptance in commercial circles.215  As manufacturing 
businesses expanded in size and complexity, simple accounting methods no 
longer sufficed to capture, measure, and account for direct and indirect costs 
adequately.216  Cost accounting influenced the overall development of 
accounting theory, which led to improved measurement of profits.217  Other 
cost accounting developments included the break-even analysis, which 
emerged in the 1950s, and the “cost-volume-profit” (CVP) analysis, which 
emerged in the mid-1960s.218  CVP analyzes “how costs and profits behave in 
response to changes in the level of business activity”219 and can help corporate 
management in determining the necessary amount of sales needed to reach a 
targeted income level, the margin of safety before an operating loss is incurred, 
and any anticipated income variation, among others.220  Due to the benefits of 
these innovations, corporate managers and shareholders alike would never look 
at costs the same way again and embraced cost accounting as a tool to control 
costs and maximize profits.221 
Despite the benefits of cost accounting, nowhere did the impact of cost 
accounting have such a garish application than in the Ford Pinto case.222  The 
Ford Motor Company began developing the Ford Pinto in 1968 to compete in 
the emerging subcompact automobile market.223  As a result of Ford’s goal to 
produce a light car at a low cost, Ford sacrificed engineering for style.224 
                                                            
 213. Janet A. Hume-Schwarz, Cost-Accounting: A Historical Perspective, 12 PROC. ACAD. 
ACCT. & FIN. STUD. 53, 53–55 (2007), available at http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/allied 
/2007-reno/Accounting%20and%20Financial%20Studies/15.pdf. 
 214. Perry v. Martin Marietta Corp., 47 F.3d 1134, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting 4. C.F.R. 
§ 331.20(k) (1992)). 
 215. Hume-Schwarz, supra note 213, at 57. 
 216. Id. at 54–55. 
 217. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 42 (noting that improved accounting methods among 
growing industrial firms meant that “[i]nventory valuations became more firmly rooted in the cost 
principle, and a better matching of revenues and expenses resulted”). 
 218. Hume-Schwarz, supra note 213, at 57. 
 219. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 96, at 890. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See Hume-Schwarz, supra note 213, at 54, 58. 
 222. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981); see also Martin 
A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law: Acting for Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41 VAND. L. 
REV. 63, 103 (1988). 
 223. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359–60. 
 224. Id. at 360. 
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During the testing phase of the Pinto, crash-test data indicated that rear-end 
damage threatened the fuel system’s integrity.225  Ford could have easily and 
inexpensively fixed the deficiency, but it chose not to do so.226  Ford produced 
326,867 Pintos in the first year of production alone.227  Consumers reported 
numerous accidents involving exploding gas tanks in rear-end collisions.228  
Only after hundreds of people lost their lives or were seriously injured229 did 
Ford act by spending “at least 20 million dollars to recall the 1971-1976 
Pintos.”230 
Ford’s macabre calculus in its decision to sell unsafe cars balanced the value 
of a human life against corporate profits.231  Specifically, it balanced $137 
million, the cost to correct the defect, against $49.5 million, the cost to defend 
lawsuits.232  Even though Ford could have remedied the hazardous fuel-tank 
design at minimal cost, it “decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by 
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against 
corporate profits.  Ford’s institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous 
indifference to public safety.”233   
Ford Motors Company is by no means the only car company with 
manufacturing problems.  In 2009, reports alleged that the gas pedals on 
Toyota and Lexus models were sticking, which caused acceleration 
problems.234  Toyota initially denied any problems with its pedals;235 however, 
an internal document surfaced in which the company stated that it saved $100 
million by delaying corrective action.236  Toyota Motors faced allegations that 
these defects resulted in multiple injuries and deaths.237  The National 
                                                            
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 360–61. 
 227. OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
INVESTIGATION REPORT, PHASE I: ALLEGED FUEL TANK AND FILLER NECK DAMAGE IN  
REAR-END COLLISION OF SUBCOMPACT PASSENGER CARS (1978), reprinted in THE FORD PINTO 
CASE: A STUDY IN APPLIED ETHICS, BUSINESS, AND TECHNOLOGY 77, 83 (Douglas Birsch & 
John H. Fielder eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE FORD PINTO CASE].  By 1976, Ford had produced a 
total of 2,213,700 Pintos.  Id. 
 228. See MARK DOWIE, PINTO MADNESS (1977), reprinted in THE FORD PINTO CASE, supra 
note 227, at 15, 16. 
 229. See Douglas Birsch, Product Safety, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Ford Pinto Case, in 
THE FORD PINTO CASE, supra note 227, at 147, 160. 
 230. DOWIE, supra note 228, at 16. 
 231. Id. at 35. 
 232. Id. at 28. 
 233. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 234. See Ralph Vartabedian & Ken Bensinger, Toyota’s Woes May Not End at Floor Mats, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at A1. 
 235. Ken Bensinger & Ralph Vartabedian, Toyota Is Publicly Rebuked on Defect, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A1. 
 236. See infra Exhibit 2. 
 237. Ken Bensinger & Ralph Vartabedian, Toyota to Fix ‘Dangerous’ Pedal Defect, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A1 (“A review of consumer complaints to the National Highway Traffic 
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Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) launched an investigation 
into the defective gas-pedal design,238 which ruled out electrical malfunction 
and operator error, but found mechanical defects in the form of “pedal 
entrapment” and “sticky pedal.”239  As a penalty for failing to report the 
defective gas pedals to NHTSA in a timely manner, the agency ultimately 
imposed a $16.375 million civil penalty on Toyota.240 
The Ford and Toyota cases illustrate why tort law is concerned with 
“socially unreasonable conduct.”241  By implication, tort law tolerates losses 
and will adjust for these losses through a system of damages awarded by 
law.242  As a matter of policy, tort law tolerates, and even expects, that a 
certain degree of injury will be placed on the public.243 
Like any actor, corporations attempt to balance costs against benefits before 
taking action.244  Corrective action, too, has a cost, which must be weighed 
against any benefits as an integral part of any business decision.245  
Manufacturers of goods, in particular, constantly face the possibility of design 
flaws in their race to beat competitors to the marketplace.246   
How, then, should corporations act in the absence of positive law?  How 
should a corporation act when corporate-law principles require it to maximize 
profitability?  Or, how should a corporation act when corporate-law principles 
                                                                                                                                         
Safety Administration shows at least 1,000 incidents of unintended acceleration in Toyota 
vehicles in the last eight years, along with scores of accidents and injuries as well as untold 
property damage.”).  Toyota ultimately recalled seven Toyota and Lexus models with the alleged 
defect.  Id. 
 238. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TECHNICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF TOYOTA ELECTRONIC THROTTLE CONTROL (ETC) SYSTEMS, at vi (2011), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NHTSA_report_execsum.pdf. 
 239. Id. at vii, ix (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 240. U.S. Department of Transportation Releases Results from NHTSA-NASA Study of 
Unintended Acceleration in Toyota Vehicles, NHTSA (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-16-11 (providing a complete timeline of events); see also Ken 
Thomas & Tomoko A. Hosaka, Toyota Recall: Automaker Pays Record Fine over Acceleration 
Problems, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2010, 7:10 AM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/21/toyota-recall-automaker-p_0_n_799549.html (stating 
that in addition to the fine levied by NHTSA, Toyota agreed to pay a $32.4 million fine to the 
U.S. government for its handling of safety recalls). 
 241. KEETON ET AL., supra note 186, at 6. 
 242. Id. (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 
238 (1944)). 
 243. Id. at 24. 
 244. See Paul R. Portney, Benefit-Cost Analysis, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 38. 
 245. See supra notes 226, 231–34 and accompanying text. 
 246. See, e.g., Top 10 Product Recalls, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages 
/article/0,28804,1908719_1908717_1974910,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011); see supra notes 
222–26 and accompanying text. 
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insulate directors from ordinary breaches of due care?247  In the absence of 
positive law, which establishes either a duty to act or an incentive to act, tort 
law encourages firms to weigh responsibility by balancing the probability and 
gravity of the injury against the burdens of action.248  The state of our current 
jurisprudence provides corporations with a powerful incentive not to balance in 
favor of responsibility.249    
Admittedly, it is unlikely that any corporate enterprise will ever again 
balance away corrective action against human life as Ford Motors did in the 
case of the Ford Pinto.  However, no one can predict with reasonable certainty 
what temptations profit pressures will bring to bear on a corporation.  What is 
certain is that the modern corporation can now affect an indeterminate number 
of individuals throughout the world within a relatively brief time frame.250  The 
cry for responsible profitability will echo from all corners of the globe. 
B.  The Role of Contract Law in CSR 
Contract law is ineffective as an instrument to encourage CSR because it is 
premised upon a consensual relationship between two or more parties who 
bargain for a specified performance.251  In contrast, CSR initiatives seek to 
impose a duty on a corporate actor without the corporation’s consent.252  The 
                                                            
 247. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011) (permitting corporations to 
include in their certificates of incorporation “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal 
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for breaches of fiduciary duty,” but 
requiring that directors must remain liable for breaches of the duties of loyalty and good faith, and 
for any improperly derived personal benefits). 
 248. See Christopher M.F. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit 
System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1057–58 (1984) (noting that 
firms “should avoid accidents only so long as the cost of avoiding accidents is less than the cost 
of allowing them to occur”). 
 249. Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate  
Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361,  
1393–94 (1993). 
 250. For instance, Ford Motor Company sells its economy-priced Ford Focus in 122 
countries.  Global Focus—Ford’s New C-Segment Product Family Poised to Achieve 
Unprecedented Scale, FORD.MEDIA.COM (Jan. 11, 2010), http://media.ford.com/article 
_display.cfm?article_id=31767.  Coca-Cola Enterprises sells its product through a system of local 
bottlers in over 200 markets.  Our Company, COCA-COLA COMPANY, http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/ourcompany/index.html (last visited on Nov. 30, 2011).  The online market for 
prescription drugs also allows firms to facilitate a sale to anyone with computer access, anywhere 
commercial deliveries are available.  See Michael OReilly, Get Ready for Online Sales of 
Prescription Drugs, 161 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 557, 557 (1999). 
 251. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1:1 (6th ed. 2009); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
 252. See Kim Kercher, Corporate Social Responsibility: Impact of Globalization and 
International Business, CORP. GOVERNANCE E-J., at 5 (Apr. 2007), 
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objective of any CSR initiative is to broaden the corporate actor’s scope of 
duty beyond the traditional norms of contract law.253  Thus, the finding of a 
positive duty is paramount to any theory of CSR.254   
At times, the line between contract-law duty and tort-law duty may blur, as 
both doctrines rely on a duty for a finding of responsibility and liability.255  
However, important doctrinal differences exist between the two.256  Contract 
law is premised on the notion of private ordering between the parties.257  
Unlike tort liability, which stems from socially unacceptable conduct,258 
liability in contract is premised on the occurrence of a breach by one of the 
parties following a voluntary bargaining process.259  In contrast, tort law seeks 
to regulate public conduct.260  Liability in tort is premised upon the breach of a 
duty to act in a socially acceptable manner.261  
At the root of contract law lies one of the most fundamental legal  
principles: the freedom to contract.262  This doctrine holds that contracting 
parties are free to define the scope of their rights and duties governing their 
relationship, provided that the agreement is not otherwise illegal or contrary to 
public policy.263  Courts zealously guard the principle of freedom of 
                                                                                                                                         
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgej/4 (discussing the debate on whether to impose CSR 
requirements on corporations). 
 253. Id. at 2–3. 
 254. See id. at 6 (noting the inability to hold corporations “accountable in the absence of 
prescriptive legislation”). 
 255. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 669 
(1989) (observing the overlap between contract- and tort-law doctrines). 
 256. See Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 623,  
626–27 (1991) (noting several important distinctions between contract and tort law). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 259. 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 63:8 (4th ed. 2002).  When breach of a promise occurs, it is necessary to evaluate 
whether the breach is material because the breach would allow the plaintiff to cancel the contract 
and sue for damages.  PERILLO, supra note 251, § 11:18.  However, the plaintiff must additionally 
prove that he or she was “ready, willing and able to perform but for the breach.”  Id. 
 260. See John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in 
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 3 (2004). 
 261. See Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors and Officers’ Liability for Supervision 
and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
1161, 1671 (2010); see also Palco Linings, Inc. v. Pavex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (M.D. Pa. 
1990) (“A policy consideration underlying tort law is the protection of persons and property from 
losses resulting from injury . . . .”); Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262, 274 
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (“The purpose of much of the law of torts . . . is to deter wrongful activity as 
well as to compensate victims thereof and to impose on proper party the cost of insuring against 
risks of certain activity.”); Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 
(N.J. 1985) (“[T]ort law protect[s] society’s interest in freedom from harm.”). 
 262. PERILLO, supra note 251, § 1:3. 
 263. Id. 
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contract,264 and once a contract is established as enforceable, courts likewise 
protect the expectation interests of the bargaining parties.265  Courts are also 
reluctant to bind parties to a contract when no legal relationship was 
intended.266 
Contract liability is based on the notion of privity of contract.267  Contract 
law mandates this relationship before liability will be imposed;268 however, a 
widely recognized exception to this rule is the law of third-party 
beneficiaries.269  The exception provides that “‘one who is not privy to . . . [an] 
agreement may demonstrate . . . that the contract was actually made for his 
benefit . . . so that he becomes a third-party beneficiary and [is] eligible to 
bring an action on such agreement.’”270  Courts have recognized the right of 
intended beneficiaries to enforce contracts since the middle of the nineteenth 
century when Judge Horace Gray stated in Lawrence v. Fox that “he for whose 
benefit [a promise] is made may bring an action for its breach.”271  However, 
the contract’s term must expressly indicate an intent to benefit the third party, 
otherwise courts will presume that no third-party beneficiary was intended.272  
Another bedrock principle of contract law is that “only parties to a contract and 
any third-party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to enforce that 
contract.”273  CSR initiatives lack the direct privity of contract or the requisite 
intent to create a third-party beneficiary designee.274  As a result, courts are 
                                                            
 264. See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.2 (2011). 
 265. Id. 
 266. PERILLO, supra note 251, § 2:1 (“Usually, an essential prerequisite to the formation of a 
contract is an agreement—a mutual manifestation of assent to the same terms.” (citing Russell v. 
Union Oil Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1970); Quality Sheet Metal Co. v. Woods, 627 P.2d 1128 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v. Considine, 310 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Christenson 
v. Billings Livestock Comm’n, 653 P.2d 492 (Mont. 1982))). 
 267. Id. § 17:1; First Nat’l Bank of Windsor v. Gilbert Marshall & Co., 780 P.2d 73, 74 
(Colo. App. 1989) (“Privity is that connection or relationship which exists between two or more 
contracting parties.” (citing Bonfils v. McDonald, 270 P. 650 (1929))). 
 268. See Peter Kiewit & Sons’, Inc. v. ATSER, LP, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1137–38 (D. Neb. 
2010).  Contract liability may also be imposed despite the lack of a contract under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel.  See, e.g., Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 167–68 (Mo. App. 
1959); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274–75 (Wis. 1965). 
 269. Peter Kiewit & Sons’, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
 270. Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 738, 747 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 271. See 20 N.Y. 268, 274 (1859). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Verni v. Cleveland Chiropractic Coll., 212 S.W.3d 150, 153 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) 
(citing Andes v. Albano, 853 S.W.2d 936, 942 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Windsor Grp., Inc., 2 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Mo. App. 1999)). 
 274. Id. 
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reluctant to find a duty to act for the benefit of some third-party beneficiary 
when it was not expressly intended.275 
Contract law also is limited as a tool of social responsibility because it is 
based on freedom of contract and mutual agreement.276  Corporations, keenly 
aware of these doctrines and mindful of courts’ reluctance to interfere in the 
bargaining process, opportunistically exploit the contracting process.  For 
example, arbitration clauses,277 forum-selection clauses,278 and home-office 
approval clauses279 are thrust on unwary consumers in many consumer, sales, 
and financing contracts.280 
Corporations exploit a procedural advantage in the contractual bargaining 
process.  A corporation’s dominant position allows it to exploit procedural 
advantages because the bargaining process is no longer conducive to a free and 
open negotiation process.281  For example, corporate field offices employ 
corporate agents who have no authority to change the terms of a contract.282  
Contracts may be structured such that acceptance is subject to approval at the 
corporate home office, which thereby cleverly converts the customer into the 
offeror.283  Similarly, structural limitations work counter to a policy of CSR.  
For example, mandatory arbitration and forum-selection provisions, limitations 
on the seller’s warranties, and loss allocations are designed to maximize a 
corporation’s contractual rights while simultaneously minimizing its 
contractual obligations.284  Contracting parties in general, and corporate parties 
in particular, routinely use structural devices to limit their contractual 
responsibility.285   
                                                            
 275. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928) (declining 
to allow an individual to bring a third-party-beneficiary claim against a water company that 
breached its contract with a city to provide water for fire hydrants). 
 276. PERILLO, supra note 251, § 2:1. 
 277. An arbitration clause is “[a] contractual provision mandating arbitration—and thereby 
avoiding litigation—of disputes about the contracting parties’ rights, duties, and liabilities.”   
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 120. 
 278. A forum-selection clause is a contractual provision designating the jurisdiction in which 
disputes will be litigated.  17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2011). 
 279. See Raj Bhala, Self-Regulation in Global Electronic Markets Through Reinvigorated 
Trade Usages, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 863, 918 (1995). 
 280. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1153 
(2008) (observing that merchants are aware of consumers’ frequent failure to read the terms of 
contracts and noting that if they did, they would likely object to arbitration or forum-selection 
clauses contained therein). 
 281. See PERILLO, supra note 251, § 1.3 (noting the decreasing role of the bargaining process 
in consumer transactions). 
 282. Bhala, supra note 279, at 918. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203–04 (2003). 
 285. See id. (noting that the majority of commercial contracts employ such devices). 
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Corporations also exploit a substantive advantage in contract law through 
the use of adhesion contracts.286  These contracts are the most common form of 
limiting responsibility and corresponding liability.287  Although both parties 
are free to enter into these contracts, the reality is that the maker of such 
adhesion contracts almost always enjoys a superior bargaining position.288   
Corporations have successfully used adhesion contracts to internalize 
benefits and externalize costs, often with drastic and inequitable results for 
society at large.  For instance, courts have recognized the rights of parties to 
bargain for forum-selection clauses.  As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., “‘(I)t is settled . . . that parties to a contract 
may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit 
notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice 
altogether.’”289   
Industry practice is another impediment for CSR initiatives.  Entire 
industries may have redrafted their contracts to minimize corporate liability.290  
For example, the oil-shipping industry outsourced certain business operations, 
such as the transportation of oil, to judgment-proof entities in order to limit 
liability.291  Another example is the drafting of a contract clause to limit the 
insurance industry’s exposure to certain types of policy risks.292  Consumers, 
who are dispersed and unorganized, face a daunting task in overcoming the 
organized and well-funded efforts of corporations and their dependent trade 
organizations. 
Parties have the freedom of contract to negotiate and include bargained 
terms in contracts,293 as well as a duty to read their documents before 
signing.294  However, the growing disparity in relative bargaining power, 
                                                            
 286. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981) (“‘The term signifies a 
standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, 
relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’” 
(quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961))). 
 287. See Korobkin, supra note 284, at 1203–04; see also Richard C. Ausness, Risky 
Business: Liability of Product Sellers Who Offer Safety Devices as Optional Equipment, 39 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 807, 814 (2011) (observing that the stronger one party’s bargaining power, the 
more likely it is that that party will attempt to limit its liability with an adhesion contract). 
 288. Graham, 623 P.2d at 171. 
 289. 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (quoting Nat’l Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,  
315–16 (1964)). 
 290. Richard R.W. Brooks, Liability and Organization Choice, 45 J.L. & ECON. 91, 93 
(2002). 
 291. See id. 
 292. See Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The “Sudden and Accidental” Exception to the Pollution 
Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of 
Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 167 (1992) (illustrating a pollution exclusion 
clause that limits insurance coverage to damage caused by “sudden and accidental” events). 
 293. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text. 
 294. See PERILLO, supra note 251, § 9.41.  For an example, see Apple’s iTunes terms and 
conditions of use, which flash on the screen and must be accepted to download the program.  
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coordinated industry practices, and a body of contracts jurisprudence that 
affirms the validity of adhesion contracts makes the branch of contract law  
ill-equipped to embark on a CSR initiative. 
C.  The Role of Corporate Law in CSR  
Shareholders seeking to require corporations to engage in socially 
responsible corporate behavior face a daunting task.  There are structural 
impediments in corporate law that shareholders must overcome.  The most 
important structural impediment is that many state statutes require a board of 
directors to oversee every corporation.295  Such provisions clearly mandate that 
the decisions and judgments of the board of directors govern the “business and 
affairs” of the corporation,296 despite the role of shareholders as the undisputed 
owners of the corporate entity.297   
Still, shareholders have attempted in earnest to influence corporate policy.  
The most common method of influencing corporate policy is through the 
annual election of directors.298  Corporate law enables the removal of a director 
by shareholders.299  However, removing and replacing directors, while 
possible, is a cumbersome and difficult task.300  Several reasons account for 
this.  The board of directors, and not the shareholders, controls the nominating 
committee for directors.301  The board of directors routinely communicates its 
recommendations for board positions to shareholders.302 Additionally, the 
board of directors has access to and use of corporate funds to finance a 
communication strategy to shareholders and to defeat any potential 
                                                                                                                                         
Apple Updated iTunes Terms and Conditions, TECH. J. (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://thetechjournal.com/electronics/iphone/apple-updated-itunes-terms-and-conditions.xhtml. 
 295. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT  
§ 8.01(b) (2011). 
 296. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
 297. Michael K. Molitor, The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: Re-Inventing 
Nominating Committees in the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 97, 100–01 (2011). 
 298. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, 
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,668, 56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“A principal way that shareholders can hold boards accountable 
and influence matters of corporate policy is through the nomination and election of directors.”). 
 299. See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1250 (2004). 
 300. See, e.g., id. (“The power of stockholders to remove a director for cause may only be 
exercised by stockholders controlling a sufficient number of votes required for action, which is at 
least a majority, but which, under particular certificates of incorporation, may be a number greater 
than a majority.”). 
 301. See Marc R. Trevino, Final SEC Proxy Access Rules, 996 PRACTISING L. INST. TAX  
& EST. PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 681, 689 (2011). 
 302. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of 
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2007) (noting that proxy statements sent to shareholders 
will indicate the board’s recommendations). 
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opponent.303  Moreover, the board of directors functions as a unified group.  In 
contrast, shareholders are fragmented, geographically dispersed, and place 
differing values on their investments in the corporation.304  Many shareholders 
also lack the financial resources to mount a campaign against a corporate 
director, let alone the corporate entity.305   
Another device available to shareholders is the use of the shareholder 
proposal.306  SEC rules permit shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion 
in proxy materials that are distributed to shareholders.307  However, 
shareholder proposals are subject to stringent procedural and substantive 
requirements.308  SEC Rule 14a-8 sets forth the proposal procedure.309  
The shareholder’s right of inclusion is not absolute and is subject to several 
important limitations.310  Rule 14a-8 limits a shareholder’s proposal right by 
stating that, among other bases, management may exclude a proposal if it 
appears to promote a shareholder’s personal interest311 or if it is related to 
ordinary business operations within the board’s purview.312  Moreover, 
shareholders seeking to include shareholder proposals can expect formidable 
corporate opposition313 and must be ready to mount an active and expensive 
campaign if their proposals are ever to be distributed.314   
The challenges that shareholders face regarding shareholder proposals is 
exemplified in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, in which the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed an SEC decision to exclude a 
                                                            
 303. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 901 (9th ed. 2008). 
 304. Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 302, at 467 (noting that the dispersed nature of 
shareholders and that “shareholder apathy,” among other things, contribute to shareholders’ 
limited influence in the election process for directors). 
 305. See id. 
 306. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (“A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or 
requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to 
present at a meeting of the company’s shareholders.  Your proposal should state as clearly as 
possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow.”). 
 307. Id. 
 308. See generally DIR. OF CORPORATE FIN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF LEGAL 
BULLETIN NO. 14 (CF), SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS (2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm (outlining the procedural and substantive hurdles 
that shareholders have to overcome to have their proposal sent with the corporation’s proxy 
information). 
 309. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 310. See id. § 240.14a-8(i).  Arguably, this may very well be a situation in which the 
exception swallows the rule. 
 311. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(4). 
 312. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
 313. See David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 253, 294 (2009) (noting that this is especially true in the case of shareholder proposals on 
social issues). 
 314. See id.; see also BREALEY ET AL., supra note 303, at 901. 
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shareholder proposal.315 The petitioner requested inclusion of a shareholder 
proposal to adopt a resolution “that napalm shall not be sold to any buyer 
unless that buyer gives reasonable assurance that the substance will not be used 
on or against human beings.”316  The SEC rejected the proposal request on the 
basis that it was untimely.317  A year later, the petitioner renewed the 
shareholder proposal and requested inclusion of a separate proposal adopting a 
resolution to stop the company’s production of napalm.318  The Court of 
Appeals remanded the case to the Commission for review.319  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari; however, because the corporation ultimately decided 
to include the shareholder proposal the matter was dismissed at moot.320  When 
the corporation submitted the proposal for a shareholder vote, not even three 
percent supported it.321 
In Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the shareholder, Amelia 
Roosevelt, appealed the district court’s decision supporting the exclusion of 
her shareholder proposal from Du Pont’s proxy materials.322  The shareholder 
proposal requested that the board of directors undertake two actions: “1. 
[r]apidly accelerate plans to phase out CFC and halon production . . . [and]  
2. [p]resent a report to shareholders within six months detailing (a) research 
and development . . . efforts to find CFC and halon substitutes . . . and (b) a 
marketing plan to sell those environmentally safe alternatives.”323 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision permitting Du Pont to exclude the shareholder’s proposal from the 
company’s proxy materials.324  The court noted that both aspects of the 
plaintiff’s proposal implicated the “‘ordinary business operations’ 
exception.”325  The court observed that the exception includes “‘certain matters 
which have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in 
them.’”326  The court further noted that Roosevelt’s rapid phase-out proposal 
would “no doubt reflect ‘significant policy’ when large [timing] differences are 
                                                            
 315. 432 F.2d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 316. Id. at 662.  The letter also stated that their “objections to the sale of this product [are] 
primarily based on the concerns for human life inherent in our organization’s credo.”  Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 663. 
 319. Id. at 682. 
 320. SEC v. Med. Com. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972). 
 321. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 11, at 689. 
 322. 958 F.2d 416, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 323. Id. at 417 n.1. 
 324. Id. at 429. 
 325. Id. at 426. 
 326. Id. (quoting Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders 
Exchange Release Act No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Dec. 3, 1976)). 
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at stake.”327  However, the court pointed out that the interval of time originally 
complained of by Roosevelt had been reduced significantly.328 
In another case, Lovenheim v. Iroquois, Ltd., the shareholder filed a lawsuit 
seeking inclusion of his proposed resolution.329   The shareholder proposed to 
create a committee that would examine its French suppliers’ method of 
producing paté de foie gras to ensure that it did not cause the geese involved in 
production to suffer.330  At the time of the lawsuit, the corporation’s annual 
revenues were $141 million with $6 million in profits and $78 million in 
assets.331  In comparison, its sales of its paté de foie gras accounted for only 
$79,000 in sales, which amounted to a net loss on paté sales.332  
The company sought to exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(c)(5), which 
provided that exclusion was appropriate 
 if the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 
percent of the issuer’s total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal 
year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for 
its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related 
to the issuer’s business.333 
Although the sales of paté de foie gras clearly met the exception, the court 
nonetheless granted a preliminary injunction “in light of the ethical and social 
significance” of the proposal.”334  The injunction barred the company from 
excluding the shareholder proposal, which requested formation of a committee 
to study the effects of the practice, from its proxy materials.335  One is left to 
wonder: if courts are willing to entertain responsible behavior regarding the 
treatment of a goose, why not do the same regarding the treatment of a human? 
The derivative lawsuit is another device that shareholders use to change 
corporate behavior.336  One court described the derivative suit as “one of the 
most interesting and ingenious of accountability mechanisms for large formal 
organizations.”337 Shareholders have invoked the derivative device to 
                                                            
 327. Id. at 427. 
 328. Id. (noting that the company changed its timeline to phase out CFC products from five 
years to one year). 
 329. 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 558. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) 
(1984)). 
 334. Id. at 561–62. 
 335. Id. at 562. 
 336. See Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit, 48 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–39 (1985) (discussing the development and use of derivative 
suits). 
 337. Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988). 
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challenge a board’s decisions.338  However, successfully invoking the 
shareholder derivative device is one of the most daunting tasks facing a 
shareholder.339 
At common law, courts did not “permit stockholders to call corporate 
managers to account in actions at law.”340  This refusal is premised on the 
common function of state statutes: to empower directors to manage and direct 
the affairs of the corporation.341  As a result, courts apply the business 
judgment rule by refusing to reexamine a corporation’s decision by reasoning 
that it is a matter that falls within the province of directorial discretion.342   
The derivative action is an equitable remedy.343  It “provide[s] redress not 
only against faithless officers and directors but also against third parties who 
had damaged or threatened the corporate properties and whom the corporation 
through its managers refused to pursue.”344  A shareholder seeking to invoke 
the derivative device must satisfy prescribed requirements.   Specifically, the 
subject matter of the dispute must be of a derivative nature, demand must be 
made upon the board of directors, and there must be a violation of a fiduciary 
duty.345  To establish whether the subject matter is of a derivative nature, the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, 
Inc. that the “issue must turn solely on the following questions: (1) who 
suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, 
individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other 
remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”346  Next, the 
                                                            
 338. See, e.g., King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1141 (Del. 2011) (derivative 
suit requiring a board to release records); In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
30 A.3d 60, 65 (Del. Ch. 2011) (derivative suit challenging the entire fairness of a proposed 
merger). 
 339. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000) (dismissing a derivative 
complaint because plaintiff failed to establish facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that 
directors were disinterested); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (noting that a plaintiff-shareholder in a derivative suit alleging improper corporate 
information gathering and reporting systems must show a suspicion that the board or senior 
management violated the law). 
 340. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970). 
 341. See 2 FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 505. 
 342. See, e.g., Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 
1992) (“Under this familiar rule of American jurisprudence, the courts refrain from second 
guessing business decisions made by corporate directors in the absence of a showing of fraud, 
unfairness or overreaching.”).  The business judgment rule creates a presumption that directors 
have acted in good faith unless the plaintiff can show fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.  See 
Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Mobil Corp. v. 
Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,375, 92,284 (S.D. 
Ohio 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
 343. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1948 (2011). 
 344. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534. 
 345. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW & PRACTICE  
§ 1.1 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
 346. 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). 
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aggrieved shareholder must make a demand upon the directors to pursue the 
derivative claim,347 and this requisite may only be excused in limited cases of 
futility.348  Finally, a plaintiff-shareholder must allege that there is a breach of 
an existing fiduciary duty.349  It is at this juncture where most, if not all, claims 
of social responsibility will fail.   
For example, in White v. Panic, the shareholders filed a derivative action 
alleging that “the board of directors affirmatively refused to take any measures 
to stop or sanction sexual misconduct by a corporate officer that allegedly 
subjected the corporation to potential civil liability and expense.” 350  The 
plaintiffs argued that the board used corporate funds to settle lawsuits against 
the officer quietly.351  In affirming the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
dismissal, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the plaintiff’s complaint did 
not show adequately that the board knew of the officer’s harassment and 
refused to take proper steps to shield the corporation from liability.352  
A plaintiff shareholder seeking to initiate a derivative action on the basis of a 
CSR initiative faces almost certain doom from both a procedural and a 
substantive basis.  Derivative actions are problematic because a shareholder 
must assert that the directors have failed to discharge their duty to the 
corporation.353  Directors have no duty of social responsibility,354  and thus 
should handily overcome a derivative action involving claims of CSR. 
The Committee on Corporate Laws considered whether constituency 
statutes, which allow directors to consider the interests of stakeholders other 
than shareholders, should be included in the Model Business Corporation 
Act.355  The committee concluded that such statutes were an inappropriate 
mechanism for regulating corporate action, noting that they “would conflict 
with directors’ responsibility to shareholders and could undermine the 
                                                            
 347. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1831 (3d ed. 2007). 
 348. Id. (“The question is whether, given the composition and structure of the board, it would 
be futile to expect it to respond to the shareholder’s concerns.”). 
 349. 12B FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 5923.30. 
 350. 783 A.2d 543, 546 (Del. 2001). 
 351. Id. at 548. 
 352. Id. at 553. 
 353. Gevurtz, supra note 38, at 386–87; see supra notes 345, 349 and accompanying text. 
 354. See David Rosenberg, Delaware’s “Expanding Duty of Loyalty” and Illegal Conduct: A 
Step Toward Corporate Social Responsibility, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 81, 82 (2012) (positing 
that expanding the fiduciary duty of loyalty may lead to a duty of CSR).  However, thirty-one 
states have allowed a corporation’s board of directors to consider the interests of constituents in 
addition to interests of the corporation when making decisions.  2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 
ann. (2008) (statutory comparison). 
 355. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Corporate Law, supra note 22, at 2253. 
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effectiveness of the system that has made the corporation an efficient device 
for the creation of jobs and wealth.”356   
Opponents of CSR can be expected to argue that directors may engage in 
less than optimal decision making when considering CSR initiatives.357  As a 
result, directors will be exposing themselves to the increased possibility of 
litigation and arguably liability to any shareholders who oppose a CSR 
initiative.358  Opponents of CSR may legitimately argue that CSR is really a 
governmental policy and as such, it should be subject to the political process of 
checks and balances.359  Moreover, critics may contend that by engaging in 
CSR initiatives, corporate management is wasting valuable corporate 
resources.360  Because CSR initiatives are vague and ambiguous, CSR 
opponents assert that they are not capable of satisfying the divergent range of 
interests.361  Finally, CSR opponents argue that CSR initiatives will cloud 
management judgment with subjective preferences, which would make it 
difficult for shareholders to evaluate management’s performance.362  Critics of 
CSR initiatives opt for the perceived objective reality of  
profitability—“perceived” because profitability is merely a sophisticated game 
of financial assumptions under the auspices of GAAP.363   
Doctrinal limitations hamper the use of corporate law as a tool for CSR 
initiatives.  Statutes empower directors, not shareholders, to manage the 
company.364  Shareholder rights are limited to dividends,365 voting,366 
informational rights,367 and rights of appraisal,368 and do not include any rights 
                                                            
 356. Id. at 2268–70; see also Zipora Cohen, Directors’ Negligence Liability to Creditors: A 
Comparative and Critical View, 26 J. CORP. L. 351, 355 (2001). 
 357. See Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” 
Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 42 (2005) (suggesting that corporate managers could 
then pursue personal interests in the name of CSR). 
 358. See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2583, 2631 (2008) (“[M]anagers could still expose themselves to shareholder liability if the 
alleged long term benefits [of CSR initiatives] are intangible enough and the sacrificed short term 
profits are very large.”). 
 359. See id. at 2632 (reflecting on the benefits of leaving policy decisions to government). 
 360. See Gary van Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency 
Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 466 (1994) (noting that those who favor 
profit maximization as the goal of corporations regard expenditures on activities unrelated to 
profit maximization as wasteful). 
 361. See Lee, supra note 357, at 42 (describing CSR as an “amorphous goal”); Piety, supra 
note 358, at 2631. 
 362. See Tom Borelli, Club CSR, TOWNHALL.COM (Aug. 19, 2006), 
http://townhall.com/columnists/tomborelli/2006/08/19/club_csr/page/full/. 
 363. See supra Part II.A. 
 364. See supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text. 
 365. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(a) (2011). 
 366. Id. § 7.21(a). 
 367. Id. § 16.02. 
 368. Id. § 13.02(a). 
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for CSR initiatives.  Corporate law is singularly limited to protecting the 
economic rights of shareholders, safeguarding the institutional corporate 
powers of the directors, and maximizing the value of the corporation.  It does 
not allow for consideration of affected third parties.  
IV.  PROPOSAL 
Crafting any solution is a difficult task, but crafting a solution on matters 
affecting one’s profitability is particularly daunting.  The first step is to start a 
dialogue about the role of the corporate enterprise and the public’s expectation 
of that role.  This inquiry requires a deep and considered look at both the social 
benefits and social costs of the corporate enterprise.  Any solution advanced by 
CSR proponents must give serious consideration to providing the legislature 
and the courts with enabling legislation.  Anything short of this approach will 
be pointless.   
To that end, this Article sets forth a two-prong proposal to encourage 
corporations to engage in socially responsible behavior.  The first prong calls 
upon the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)369 to enact 
accounting legislation that will encourage corporations to act in a socially 
responsible manner.  The second prong calls upon Congress to enact tax 
legislation that will encourage corporations to engage in socially responsible 
action.  This two-part proposal encourages corporations to act responsibly 
while maintaining the twin goals of economic prosperity and social 
responsibility.   
A.  The Role of Accounting Pronouncements in Shaping CSR 
First, the PCAOB should adopt an accounting rule that allows corporations 
engaging in socially responsible conduct to amortize the cost of socially 
responsible initiatives over a reasonable number of periods, as opposed to 
expensing the cost in one period.  For example, capitalizing and amortizing the 
costs of corrective action over a period of ten years will help incentivize 
responsible corporate action.370  Accounting rules are flexible and permissive; 
therefore, the PCAOB can draft such rules beyond the traditional profit-loss 
dichotomy to include socially responsible actions.   
Profitability is no longer solely a function of a successful corporate sales 
operations; it is also a function of optimizing the choice of accounting policies.  
                                                            
 369. The PCAOB “is a nonprofit corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of 
public companies in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the 
preparation of informative, accurate and independent audit reports.”  PUB. COMPANY ACCT. 
OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://pcaobus.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorized the creation of the PCAOB.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2010)). 
 370. Cf. 2009 FEDERAL TAX COURSE ¶ 707, at 290 (2008) (explaining that amortization is 
used for intangible assets in the same manner depreciation is used for tangible assets). 
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It is no secret that the choice of a particular revenue-recognition policy, 
inventory method, or depreciation method affects a firm’s profitability.371  
Corporate management chooses accounting policies in accordance with the 
accounting principles promulgated by GAAP or IFRS.   
Consider pension-plan accounting.  Like most other accounting policies, 
pension-plan accounting evolved from a simple cash-basis expense concept, 
which recognized the expense when paid, into a sophisticated and complex 
array of accrual-basis measurements, which recognize the expense when 
incurred.372 Pension plans have been a part of the American economy since the 
late nineteenth century.373   
The collapse of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation in 1963 brought 
pension plans to the nation’s attention.374  The Studebaker company’s pension 
liabilities exceeded its available assets; therefore, it did not have the sufficient 
assets to liquidate its pension-plan obligations when the company’s plant 
closed.375  Although retirees received their full benefits, Studebaker was unable 
to honor its pension obligations to younger employees.376  After the failure of 
the Studebaker-Packard Corporation, Congress became concerned that many 
American companies had either unfunded or underfunded pension liabilities.377 
Until 1965, it had been a common practice for companies to leave the true 
cost of pension expense unrecorded and unreported.378  In 1966, the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued APB Opinion No. 8, which marked 
the first time that the accounting profession formally addressed pension-plan 
accounting.379  APB Opinion No. 8 sought to change the accounting treatment 
from a cash basis to an accrual basis.380  The opinion provided companies with 
guidance in measuring and reporting a company’s pension liabilities381 and 
                                                            
 371. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 176–79, 288–89, 312. 
 372. KIESO ET AL., supra note 159, at 1026 & n.10. 
 373. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 2–3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4840. 
 374. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683–84 
(2001). 
 375. Id. at 726, 730. 
 376. Id. at 684. 
 377. Id. at 726. 
 378. KIESO ET AL., supra note 159, at 1026 (“The problem was that the amount paid or 
funded in a fiscal period depended on financial management and was too often discretionary. For 
example, funding could depend on the availability of cash, the level of earnings, or other factors 
unrelated to the requirements of the plan.”); see also William C. Norby, Accounting for Financial 
Analysis, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1979, at 18, 18. 
 379. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF PENSION PLANS, OPINION NO. 8, at 67–68 (1966), available at 
http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/aicpa&CISOPTR=103&CISOSHO
W=64. 
 380. Id. at 69. 
 381. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 484 (recommending that the amount charged as 
normal pension cost and the actual amount contributed to the fund should be reported on the 
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justifications for choosing among alternatives for measuring and recording 
pension liabilities.382   
Companies had to account for two major pension costs: past-service costs 
and current-year costs.383  APB Opinion No. 8 averred that an “unfunded prior 
service cost is not a liability which should be shown in the balance sheet.”384  
Ten percent of the past service cost should be included in the annual provision 
for pension cost under the maximum-reporting method.385  Opponents of this 
position argue that unfunded past-service costs can be quite substantial and, 
therefore, should be funded immediately.386  Critics charged that it was still 
possible under APB Opinion No. 8 to continue with unfunded pension 
liabilities.387  APB Opinion No. 8 provided the accounting justification for 
choosing among different expense methodologies.388 
Nine years elapsed before Congress finally addressed the brewing  
pension-funding crisis by enacting the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA).389  ERISA established clear guidelines for 
participation, vesting, and funding requirements for private pension 
plans.390  However, the question of pension liability funding was not 
completely resolved because ERISA permitted employers to 
amortize unfunded  
past-service liability over thirty or forty years, depending on the type 
                                                                                                                                         
company’s accounting sheets as an accrued pension liability).  Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 87 superseded APB Opinion No. 8 in 1985 and provided that pension costs should 
be disclosed on the corporate balance sheet.  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 87: EMPLOYERS ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS 5 
(1985), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs 
&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820920574&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.  Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard No. 158 is the latest accounting statement concerning  
pension-plan accounting and provides that companies with defined benefit plans must report the 
difference between pension-plan assets and pension-plan obligations as an asset or liability.  FIN. 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 158: 
EMPLOYERS’ ACCOUNTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION AND OTHER POSTRETIREMENT 
PLAN 1 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata 
&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175817798717&blobheader=application%2
Fpdf. 
 382. William C. Norby, Accounting for Financial Analysis, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 
1981, at 22, 22. 
 383. See Patrick J. Regan, Potential Corporate Liabilities Under ERISA, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Mar.-Apr. 1970, at 26, 27. 
 384. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., supra note 379, at 76. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 481–82. 
 387. See, e.g., id. at 482. 
 388. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., supra note 379, at 73. 
 389. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006)). 
 390. 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 10 (2011). 
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of employer and when the plan was created.391  After the passage of 
ERISA, companies were still able to continue the practice of partially 
recording and partially funding pension liabilities, demonstrating the 
fluid nature of accounting pronouncements.   
Similar to the flexible pension-accounting provisions, the PCAOB should 
adopt accounting conventions that recognize the cost of past corrections and 
report them in future periods.  This will have the advantage of allowing the 
corporation to correct the defect immediately and amortize the cost of the 
defect into future periods.  Adopting accounting rules that permit companies to 
invest in and to amortize the cost of socially responsible action benefits both 
the corporation and society.  The corporation derives a benefit in the form of a 
cost that is spread over a reasonable period of time, and society derives a 
benefit in the form of corporate conduct designed to yield positive results.  
Amending accounting rules to allow amortization of the cost of CSR initiatives 
is reasonable and justifiable.  
B.  The Role of Tax Law in Shaping CSR 
Congress should also use tax law to encourage corporations to engage in 
socially responsible behavior.  Since the enactment of the Internal Revenue 
Code in 1913, Congress has passed a series of tax initiatives aimed at 
encouraging behavior that would yield positive benefits for American society.  
Congress’s most prominent use of tax law is providing for tax incentives 
aimed at stimulating economic activity.  Business tax incentives aimed to 
encourage capital investment and economic development include the 
Investment Tax Credit,392 the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit,393 and the Orphan 
Drug Tax Credit.394  Additional business tax incentives include granting 
businesses favorable tax deductions in the form of accelerated depreciation,395 
elections to expense certain costs,396 and granting deductions for intangible 
costs that otherwise would be subject to capitalization.397  Congress also has 
provided individual tax incentives aimed at stimulating behavior.  For 
                                                            
 391. ERISA § 303(b)(2)(B). 
 392. 26 U.S.C. § 46 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 393. 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/HRD-91-33, TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT, EMPLOYER ACTIONS TO RECRUIT, HIRE, AND 
RETAIN ELIGIBLE WORKERS VARY 2  (1991). 
 394. 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).  This law gives a fifty-percent tax credit for 
any expenditures on any medical clinical testing for creating drugs to treat orphan diseases.  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ORPHAN DRUG  
ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 4 (2001). 
 395. 26 U.S.C. § 168 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 396. Id. § 179. 
 397. Id. § 197. 
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example, Congress provided individuals with a homeowner tax credit398 and 
the Hope Education Tax Credit.399  
Most notably, tax law has also been invoked to combat repugnant behavior.  
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court’s application of 
tax law shaped behavior repugnant to social values.400  The Court heard 
challenges by Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian School, which 
challenged the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) denial of their tax-exempt 
status.401   
Bob Jones University, a religious and educational institution, barred African 
Americans from admission until 1971.402  In 1971, the school began to accept 
applications from African Americans who had an African-American spouse.403  
The university’s opposition to interracial dating and marriage motivated this 
policy.404  In 1975, the university admitted unmarried African Americans, but 
still prohibited interracial dating.405  
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. was a religious and educational institution 
that offered instruction for all grades and gave particular emphasis to Christian 
teachings.406  Goldsboro Christian Schools accepted only Caucasian students 
as a matter of course, but occasionally would admit a multiracial applicant if 
one parent was Caucasian.407 
Earlier, in 1970, the IRS had reasoned that “it could ‘no longer legally 
justify allowing tax-exempt status [under § 501(c)(3)] to private schools which 
practice racial discrimination.’”408  The IRS thus had denied tax-exempt status 
to both schools to “discourage racial discrimination in education.”409  In 
reviewing the challenges by both schools, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court’s holding in favor of the government.410  The Supreme Court 
declared that “[s]ection 501(c)(3) . . .  must be analyzed and construed within 
the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the background of the 
Congressional purposes.”411  The Supreme Court was persuaded by the 
compelling social purpose that Congress pursued in the elimination of racial 
                                                            
 398. Id. § 36. 
 399. Id. § 25A. 
 400. See generally 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 401. Id. at 577–85. 
 402. Id. at 580. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. at 583. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at 574 (quoting I.R.S. News Release, 7 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6790 (July 10, 
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 409. Id. at 579 (citation omitted). 
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 411. Id. at 586. 
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discrimination.412  The Supreme Court noted that “Congress sought to provide 
tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of 
private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the 
place of public institutions of the same kind.”413 
In similar fashion, Congress should adopt tax-related legislation that 
discourages corporations from engaging in repugnant behavior that harms the 
public and that is reasonably avoidable.  Specifically, Congress should adopt 
legislation requiring companies to demonstrate that (1) they took reasonable 
steps to safeguard products before such products are placed into the stream of 
commerce or (2) they took immediate action upon learning of a defect if such 
defect is discovered after the product enters the stream of commerce.  
Companies that fail to demonstrate that they took reasonable steps to safeguard 
products or immediate action upon learning of a defect must pay an excise tax 
on all product-line sales.  Limited exemptions would be available for start-up 
companies, wholly service-oriented companies, and small-cap companies with 
limited distribution capabilities.  The IRS, by regulation, can designate safe 
harbors that satisfy the “reasonable steps” standard.  Additionally, if a 
company refuses to pay the excise tax, the IRS would have the authority to 
advance monies to the fund and charge the corporation or, alternatively, assess 
the amount of the unpaid tax against a “responsible person,” such as an officer 
of the corporation.414  Acquirers of stock or assets of the corporation known to 
have excise tax penalties shall become secondarily liable in the event that the 
corporation fails to satisfy its obligation.  The IRS thus should impose the 
excise tax on a purchaser of stock or assets in the event the transferor fails to 
satisfy their liability.  The IRS should use the excise tax to establish a litigation 
fund for plaintiffs alleging damages caused by unsafe products.415  This 
approach is reasonable because the corporation is best able to demonstrate that 
it took reasonable steps to safeguard products placed into the stream of 
commerce. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A common assumption of those who make public-policy decisions is that 
economic efficiency, the condition of obtaining the most benefit for the least 
cost,416 is a good standard to justify policy choices.  The idea of economic 
                                                            
 412. Id. at 603–04. 
 413. Id. at 588. 
 414. Cf. Employment Taxes and the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=108357,00.html (last updated 
Feb. 8, 2012). 
 415. See, e.g., The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG. & 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/laws/osltf.html (last updated 
Sept. 24, 2010). 
 416. See Paul Heyne, Efficiency, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra 
note 4, at 136, 137. 
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efficiency finds a natural home in a free-market economy that “allows each 
person to satisfy his or her preferences in such a way as to give that person the 
greatest freedom, personal autonomy of choice, and utility of outcome.”417  
Efficiency is optimal when the parties have relatively equal bargaining power, 
and thus each party will seek to maximize his or her own advantage.   
However, the idea of economic efficiency within the context of unrestrained 
free-market capitalism warrants reexamination.  The economic-efficiency 
standard needs to be considered in light of the economic and structural barriers 
that now protect the corporate enterprise at the expense of the public.  
Efficiency becomes suboptimal when relative bargaining powers become 
increasingly disproportionate, when choices are limited, or when costs are 
externalized.  As the gap between efficiency gains on one side and efficiency 
losses on the other widens, the transactions inevitably translate into an overall 
inefficiency gap negatively affecting society.  As a result, inefficiency losses 
become counterproductive to society as a whole.  In short, responsibility is 
traded for efficiency.  
The current legal structure strongly discourages—if not unequivocally 
prohibits—corporations from considering their impact on a third party.  To 
invoke the judicial protection, courts must first ascertain a statutory or 
common-law duty.  Without a positive duty to act, corporations are left to their 
own devices as to what constitutes acceptable behavior.  Directors will pursue 
the path of profitability to avoid shareholders’ allegations of breach of 
fiduciary duty.  Even with a majority of socially minded directors, absent a 
positive duty to act, directors will err on the side of caution and continue on the 
path of profit maximization.  It is not for lack of desire that a director may fail 
to act; rather it is what the law requires and what shareholders expect: that 
directors aim to maximize firm profitability.  As two distinguished 
commentators write, 
[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory 
laws just because the laws exist.  They must determine the 
importance of these laws.  The penalties Congress names for 
disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice 
in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based 
on the supposition that managers not only may but also should 
violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.418 
To reverse more than a century’s worth of jurisprudence and commercial 
expectations will require legislative action; anything short is insufficient. 
Every person, individual and corporation alike, has the right to earn a profit. 
This is an indisputable premise of American society.  Corporations, as 
                                                            
 417. Introduction to THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY CHOICE: BEYOND THE 
MARKET PARADIGM 5, 5 (John Martin Gillroy & Maurice Wade eds., 1992). 
 418. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 
80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982). 
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possessors of capital, are particularly adept at exploiting the accumulation of 
capital.  However, the ownership of capital does not give its possessor the 
unfettered right to take risks or engage in conduct that creates an 
uncompensated cost to society while creating a benefit for the corporation and 
its shareholders.  Adding enforceable elements of social responsibility is the 
next chapter in the evolutionary process of the corporate enterprise. 
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EXHIBIT NO. 1 
2012] Responsible Profitability? Not on My Balance Sheet! 699 
 
EXHIBIT  NO. 2 
  
Toyota’s Internal Memorandum available at: James R. Healy & Sharon Silke 
Carty, Internal Toyota Memo Surfaces on Saving Safety, USA  
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2010-02-21-toyota-recall-
documents_N.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
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